The editorial staff

A year after the signing of the Washington Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, the economic dimension of this diplomatic rapprochement is beginning to reveal its first realities. While the agreement has sparked renewed interest from American investors in Congo’s mineral resources, this breakthrough is not expected to fundamentally alter the current structure of the global copper and cobalt trade, a sector heavily oriented towards Beijing.

Invited to an online discussion forum (SpaceX) moderated by journalist Stanis Bujakera, American researchers Jason Stearns and Joshua Walker revisited the conclusions of their latest analysis. Twelve months after the agreement was formalized, the two experts offer a clear-eyed assessment: both politically and economically, the Washington Agreement is now at a standstill.

The “America First” policy in the face of industrial reality

When asked about the potential benefits for Kinshasa of diversifying its partners by negotiating with Western firms like Kobold Metals, Mercuria, and Ivanhoe, or through deals with Gécamines, given that China absorbs more than two-thirds of the DRC’s red metal and cobalt exports, Jason Stearns cautioned against confusing announcements with the reality on the ground. In his view, Washington’s activism stems primarily from a very specific national doctrine.

“The logic is to use the diplomatic weight of the United States to gain better access to Congolese mineral resources and try to reduce the role of Chinese supply chains in a context of global economic rivalry. We are not making a moral judgment on this approach. We are simply asking ourselves whether it can actually produce the desired results. In our view, it is difficult to answer in the affirmative,” explains the researcher.

American megaprojects still in the planning stages

To support his skepticism, the expert points out that the major American maneuvers orchestrated in recent months have not yet progressed beyond the stage of technical discussions. This is the case with Virtus’s proposed takeover of Chemaf, Kobold Metals’ interest in lithium, and the rumors of acquisitions of stakes in Glencore’s assets.

“Many of these cases are not finalized. Even the financing arrangements for some projects remain open. There are still many unknowns regarding these investments,” Jason Stearns points out.

But the crux of the problem lies elsewhere. According to the researcher, even if all these financial transactions were to materialize, they would still be insufficient to reverse the hegemonic balance of power that has taken hold in the former Katanga.

“Let’s imagine that all these investments actually materialize. American companies would then have a larger presence in several mining projects. But that doesn’t mean that supply chains would change direction. A large portion of the mines would continue to belong to Chinese groups and, above all, the refining, processing, transportation, and marketing infrastructure would remain largely organized around China. Controlling a mine in the DRC doesn’t mean controlling the entire mining sector. As long as the stages following extraction remain dominated by the same players, the overall balance changes very little,” he explains.

A systemic hegemony impossible to challenge in the short term

The researchers’ analysis highlights a structural reality: Beijing’s power in the DRC is not limited to the mere ownership of the deposits. It rests on absolute control of the entire value chain, from the initial financing of mining infrastructure to the metallurgical processing of concentrates, and finally their integration into the battery industry and energy transition technologies.

In this context, the arrival of American capital will at most allow Kinshasa to marginally diversify its client portfolio, without weaning the global industry off its dependence on Chinese supply chains.

On a purely diplomatic level, Jason Stearns concluded his remarks by qualifying the scope of the Washington agreement. While acknowledging that the text initially represented progress, which he described as “admittedly imperfect,” he observed that a year later, the mechanisms intended to restore peace and security in eastern DRC are faltering, illustrating the structural limitations of an initiative that has remained a dead letter both in terms of security and the economy.