On the first half of 2026, the volume of trade between China and the six states (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, and Chad) of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is estimated at 5,925.9 billion CFA francs (around $10.2 billion USD). This performance, made public by the Chinese customs, leads to a net surplus of nearly $2 billion USD thanks to the oil exports from Congo, Gabon, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.

In this context, Cameroon is the only country in the region with a deficit vis-à-vis Beijing. This reflects the fragility of a model where the regional surplus is almost exclusively due to oil revenue, rather than a diversified industrial base capable of withstanding an oil shock.

Compared to the nearly $203.5 billion USD of trade between China and all African countries during the same period, trade with CEMAC represents only about 5% of Sino-African commerce. This marks a 24% increase year-on-year, according to Chinese customs. In the context of China’s total foreign trade, close to $3.675 trillion USD, the weight of the sub-region falls below half a percentage point. These figures strongly relativize the institutional discourse that regularly presents Central Africa as a strategic priority for Beijing, while its actual influence in bilateral trade negotiations remains limited.

This diagnosis comes as China activated, since May 1, 2026, total customs exemption for exports from 53 African countries with diplomatic relations with Beijing, an extension of the system inaugurated at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2003 and strengthened after the 2024 summit. Several analysts, including those from the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS) and the Africa-China Centre for Policy & Advisory, see it as “less a gesture of generosity than a geopolitical tool aimed at securing Chinese access to critical minerals (cobalt, lithium, rare earths) while diverting Chinese industrial overcapacity to Africa, in a context of trade tensions with Washington. For CEMAC, whose exports are still dominated by oil, the potential benefit of the measure will largely depend on the ability of non-oil economies, starting with Cameroon, to diversify their exportable offer beyond raw materials.

At the continental level, the African trade deficit with China continues to widen, surpassing $56 billion USD by the end of June 2026. The central question for CEMAC capitals is therefore not so much the gross volume of trade but their ability to transform preferential access to the Chinese market into real productive diversification, rather than simply extending dependence on hydrocarbons.