Talk of the Town
At the end of 2022 news began to emerge on the Chinese internet of multiple disturbances at Gwadar port, the jewel of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).In mid-December, an explosion in Jiwani, a town to the west of Gwadar, stirred up speculation on the security situation at the port, an increasingly important issue in the China-Pakistan relationship. Multiple influential Weibo posts presented the explosion as an attack by “Balochistan rebels” and asserted that it had destroyed “25% of Pakistan’s oil reserve” in one strike.
Some Chinese media outlets noted statements by Pakistani officials that the explosion was a pure accident caused by a short circuit, which was then confirmed by COPHC, the Chinese company that runs the Gwadar Port. The clarification came to support the views of some Chinese commentators that India’s “social media forces” were using the occasion to paint a picture of local hostility and unrest around the port. Apparently finding that most of the arguments focusing on the destruction of 25% of Pakistan’s oil reserves were circulated by Indian Twitter accounts and picked up at face value by Chinese commentators, they reminded fellow Chinese social media users to be on alert to such manipulation.
Unfortunately, the effort to dispel doubts over the security situation at Gwadar immediately met with a major challenge. In the week of Dec 22, Maulana Hidayat ur Rehman, leader of the local protest led by Gwadar Rights Movement (Haq Do Tehreek) called on Chinese citizens to leave the port or face potential attack, a major escalation after weeks of mostly peaceful protest. The protestors’ main grievances were about the activities of industrial trawlers that threaten local fishermen’s livelihoods and the right to conduct informal trade on the border with Iran, among other issues not directly related to the port itself. But at this point there was little maneuver space to separate the protests from CPEC itself. Mainstream Chinese media was almost completely silent on the situation, leaving a few online commentators with a long-term interest in overseas Chinese endeavors to introduce the situation to the Chinese audience. They framed the issue as the Gwadar Port being used by Rehman as a hostage to advance personal political gains (Rehman is reportedly eyeing a Provincial Assembly seat), and emphasized Pakistan’s promise to China to protect CPEC personnel and assets (Readers would remember that during Prime Minister Sharif’s recent visit to Beijing, the two sides specifically signed a new agreement to enhance CPEC security).
As the protests were ongoing in Gwadar, the Chinese Embassy in Islamabad appeared to be running a counter-campaign to boost the image of the project in Pakistan. On Dec 28, Ambassador Nong Yong received a delegation from Pakistani think tank ISSI, which included former Pakistan Ambassador to China Naghmana Hashmi. The delegation had just come back from a tour of Gwadar funded by the embassy and reaffirmed their commitment to “conveying a truthful, positive image of CPEC”, partly through platforms such as the Gwadar Business Forum and Friends of Gwadar. Two days later, the Chinese Embassy held a ceremony giving awards to 34 Pakistani staff members of multiple CPEC projects, including Gwadar Port, for their outstanding services.
By the start of 2023 the social unrest in Gwadar had quietened down after military and police took more forceful actions including curfews and bringing murder charges against Rehman (a policeman was killed in the unrest). The political repercussions will likely linger well into 2023, however. The same Chinese commentators celebrated Pakistan’s “fulfilling its commitment” to CPEC security, but the efforts to win the hearts and minds of the Gwadar people will probably take more than police action and business-as-usual publicity work by the Chinese Embassy.
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