The Iranian strategy in the nuclear talks with the US, led by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi (who operates under a direct mandate from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei), is based on the effort to limit the talks to a technical arrangement that preserves the entire nuclear infrastructure of Iran — an approach identical to every previous objective of Iran in prior rounds of negotiations.

According to various assessments, Iran can easily produce military-grade uranium (90%) due to the growth of its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%, and the expansion of its advanced centrifuge capability.

Iran needs 25 kilograms of uranium enriched to 90% for every nuclear warhead, according to assessments by the American Institute for Science and International Security, led by David Albright, a global expert on nuclear matters.

It can produce enough for the first 10 bombs within a month — though it still needs more time to assemble an actual nuclear warhead, separate from uranium enrichment.

According to various assessments, Iran has not yet fully activated the weapons group responsible for building the warhead itself. At most, according to the Institute for Science and International Security, Iran is about six months away from a crude nuclear bomb.

At the same time, Israel is weighing whether to strike, if a bad agreement is signed, as hinted by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite the consequences of such a scenario.

Another scenario is that the talks collapse, and the United States, using the forces it has amassed in the Middle East — especially its heavy bombers carrying bunker-penetrating bombs — will join a strike.

Bombers such as the B-2 aircraft, stationed at Diego Garcia in the Pacific Ocean, are especially relevant for striking Iran’s underground nuclear sites, like the enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow, due to their ability to carry heavy penetrating bombs such as the GBU-57.

Such a bomb, weighing about 13 tons, can penetrate nuclear sites operating deep underground.

The United States is also supposed (though the timeline is still unclear) to supply Israel with KC-46A Boeing refueling aircraft, although Israel is already equipped with smaller Boeing 707 (Ram) refueling planes.

The US has reportedly provided Israel with thousands of MK 84 bombs weighing about 900 kilograms each. Theoretically, these could also be used in any future Israeli strike on Iran.

Due to Israel’s messages of determination not to leave a whole nuclear infrastructure in Iran under any circumstances, it appears that military conflict with Iran is inevitable in every scenario, with the main question being whether Israel will strike alone or with the US.

Any possible strike on Iran is expected, according to assessments, to be a campaign rather than a ‘one and done’ operation, as stated by former Israeli Air Force commander Maj.-Gen. (res.) Amikam Norkin at a JNS conference in Jerusalem on April 28, 2025.

Iran still possesses a large arsenal of ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel, American bases in the region, and oil facilities of Arab states in the Gulf.

Meir Ben Shabbat, head of the Misgav Institute, who served as head of the Israeli National Security Council between 2017–2021 and was one of the architects of the Abraham Accords, and previously served for 30 years in the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), filling three roles equivalent to the rank of Maj.-Gen. in the IDF, shared with the Alma Center the criteria that Israel would want to see in any future nuclear agreement with Iran.

Reading these criteria leaves little doubt that Iran has no intention of meeting Israel’s demands for a reasonable agreement.

Ben Shabbat emphasized that “any agreement must include the following components — elimination of enriched uranium stockpiles and destruction of Iran’s centrifuges and conversion and enrichment facilities.” He added that in the context of weapon systems, “Iran must cease all planning and development activities related to the weapons system [nuclear warheads], fully expose past activities, and dismantle research centers engaged in warhead technologies, which operate under academic and civilian cover.”

Referring to delivery systems, Ben Shabbat determined that “Iran must stop its ballistic missile program, intended for nuclear warheads.” Another key component listed by Ben Shabbat was that “Iran must not be allowed to retain any nuclear capabilities on its soil.”

He explained that “the world made a mistake at the time, led by President Obama, by signing the agreement [2015], which granted Tehran legitimacy while it continued to secretly develop its weapons program.”

Ben Shabbat called for the inclusion of “full effective supervision (without prior coordination, without location restrictions, and without limitations on the methods of supervision) on Iran’s activities from now on,” and demanded to ensure “a mechanism for automatic punishment for violations and deviations.” Finally, Ben Shabbat stated that the validity of the agreement must be “without an expiration date (that is, permanent).”

Ben Shabbat addressed the question of whether there is a chance that the future agreement will, in fact, be the JCPOA (the 2015 nuclear deal) under a different cover.

He believed that this would “not necessarily” be the case, because, according to him, “President Trump understands well the risks of reaching such an agreement.” Ben Shabbat recalled that Trump was the one “who defined the JCPOA agreement as ‘a horrible deal,’ ’embarrassing,’ and ‘rotten’ and presented its weaknesses to the entire world.”

Regarding the Iranian demand for a civilian nuclear program, Ben Shabbat said that Trump “then defined it as ‘a tremendous fiction of the murderous regime’ and clarified that, aside from the direct threats posed by Iran, such an agreement could spark a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East.”

Ben Shabbat stressed that “the arguments from 2018 [the year Trump withdrew from the previous nuclear agreement] have only gained strength in the years since, due to Iran’s involvement in the Ukraine war, arming of proxy organizations and fueling conflicts in the Middle East, and the unprecedented missile and UAV attacks on the State of Israel.” He concluded this point by stating, “It does not require bold imagination to understand the danger posed by the combination of a radical Islamic regime, modern missile capabilities, and nuclear abilities.”

Regarding the issue of confidence-building measures on the path to an agreement, Ben Shabbat was adamant in his position. “There is no place for confidence-building measures from the US and the world towards Iran,” he said, calling for the opposite: “On the contrary, the sanctions regime should be tightened and fully enforced, and Europe should be prepared to activate the snapback mechanism [which allows the rapid reimposition of sanctions that were previously instated by the UN Security Council].”

How does this position compare to the stance presented so far by the United States?

Washington has not yet revealed its full demands from Iran and has used the three rounds of talks mainly to create a good atmosphere, with several vague and even contradictory statements from Trump’s envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, regarding Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program, followed later by clarification that it refers only to the import of enriched uranium up to a low level of 3.67% only.

A fourth round of talks that was supposed to occur on May 3 was postponed, after Iranian officials reportedly accused the US of presenting contradictory positions.

Meanwhile, during the ongoing negotiations and Iran’s strategy to buy time on the way to a cosmetic arrangement, Iran has been acting intensively to upgrade its air defense systems, which were severely damaged by an Israeli Air Force attack on October 24, 2024 (in response to a barrage of about 200 ballistic missiles fired by Iran at Israel at the beginning of that month).

During Iran’s Army Day parade, held on April 18 in Tehran, Iran publicly displayed components of Russian-made S-300 air defense systems.

Dr. Uzi Rubin, senior researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and founder and former director of the Arrow missile defense project at the Ministry of Defense, examined photos from the parade and advised caution in their interpretation. He noted that he saw components indicating two batteries, as well as what appeared to be two radar vehicles, and a “camouflaged” logistic vehicle — disguised as a commercial truck.

Offensively, Iran apparently still possesses hundreds of ballistic missiles in its arsenal with a range that can reach Israel, after firing about 500 missiles in two separate barrages (on April 13, 2024, and October 1, 2024).

The ballistic missiles can be used to carry conventional warheads or, in the future, nuclear ones. This arsenal is a central component of Iran’s ability to threaten its enemies.

Iran’s attacks on Israel in 2024 included some of its most advanced missiles, including the liquid-fueled Emad missile, a version of the Qadr missile (itself a version of the Shahab-3), the Khorramshahr-2 missile (solid-fueled based on the Fateh-110), and apparent use of the Iranian hypersonic missile, Fattah-1.

Israel’s Arrow 3 air defense system intercepted most of the threats in both attacks, assisted by the United States and regional states, which also intercepted part of the aerial threats.

Israel responded on October 26 with extensive waves of attacks in Iran, striking Iranian air defense systems and solid fuel missile production facilities, as well as, according to media reports, a site in Parchin connected to the nuclear program.

Coincidentally or not, the explosion at Bandar Abbas port in Iran on April 27, in a tank containing chemicals related to the production of solid missile fuel, which was imported from China, apparently harmed Iran’s ability to fuel some of its missiles in preparation for a possible renewed confrontation with Israel.

Iran’s oil exports, especially to China, are a critical source of income for the Iranian regime. China buys most of Iran’s oil, bypassing American sanctions, and allows the Iranian regime to fund its military and nuclear programs, as well as the activities of its proxies in the region. Therefore, the series of sanctions imposed by the US in recent weeks on Chinese entities involved in oil imports constitutes a significant economic blow against Iran.

Against the background of diplomatic and military developments, Israel continues to place its military option “on the table.” Israel acts from complete distrust in the usefulness of the talks or in Iran’s ability to adhere to future agreements.

Alongside these discussions and reports, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently hinted in several public appearances that Israel would not hesitate to act independently. Although he did not explicitly state whether Israel would still act if an agreement is signed that allows Iran to retain critical nuclear infrastructure, it seems he hinted at this possibility as well.

The possibility of an Israeli strike also relies, among other things, on the significant strengthening of the Israeli Air Force in recent years. International media reports indicated the upgrade of long-range strike capabilities, the acquisition of stealth F-35 fighter jets that are expected to lead every long-range attack wave, and weapon systems intended to destroy sophisticated air defense systems.

These capabilities have enabled Israel to develop an independent military option with reasonable chances of success, even if the target is as complex as Iran’s dispersed and deeply buried nuclear facilities, such as the enrichment plants in Natanz and Fordow.

However, an Israeli strike on Iran could, in any case, exact a heavy price and pose significant risks. It could lead to a large-scale missile war, in which Iran might respond with a massive missile and UAV attack on Israel.

Iran has built underground missile cities, with the ability to fuel the missile underground and quickly launch it when it emerges with a launcher above ground. It is therefore likely that any strike on the nuclear facilities will be accompanied by attacks on Iranian missile bases and that this will be a full campaign of strikes, not a single concentrated attack.

Moreover, the issue of economic targets such as ports and oil facilities, which are existential infrastructure for the survival of the regime in Tehran, is also on the table. The threat to economic targets could restrain Iran’s response to a strike on its nuclear program. If not, there would be no reason to avoid attacking these sites, in the hope of destabilizing the regime.

In addition to the serious erosion of Iran’s air defense system, Iran currently does not have the ability to massively activate its proxies in response to a strike on its nuclear sites. Hamas is almost entirely out of the picture as a force with rocket firepower, Hezbollah’s arsenal has been severely damaged during the war, and the Houthis are losing offensive capabilities due to the US campaign of attacks in Yemen.

On the other hand, it is important to note that even a successful strike would not necessarily completely end Iran’s nuclear program as long as the current regime remains in power. The scientific knowledge accumulated in Iran over the years, as well as the ability to re-establish basic infrastructure, will continue to pose a threat as long as the current regime controls Iran.

A military strike can delay the program but not eliminate it completely, especially if Iran chooses to move some of its activities to even more protected underground facilities or to secret sites that have not yet been discovered. Therefore, the military achievement may be temporary, after which Iran may renew its efforts with even greater vigor — which would probably lead to another round of strikes as long as the Iranian regime stands and adheres to its ideology calling for the destruction of Israel.

The main reason Iran seeks to become a nuclear state is to provide a nuclear umbrella for its proxies and to deter Israel, as well as Sunni Arab states, from acting against its proxies while they attack. All this is in line with the vision of destroying Israel by 2040, as Iran publicly declares, and overthrowing pro-Western regimes in the Middle East.

Therefore, the option of not acting is more dangerous.