Critical minerals that underpin economic and national security remain at the top of the geoeconomic agenda, with global competition for these resources showing no signs of slowing in 2026.

These materials are central to the energy transition, digital infrastructure and defence capabilities, and the struggle for supply chain security and access to them is both shaping, and being shaped by, wider geopolitical dynamics.

Understanding these geopolitical dynamics is essential both for countries seeking to diversify and secure supply chains and for producer countries looking to capture value from rising demand.

Looking ahead to 2026, our Senior Geopolitical Risks Advisor Olena Borodyna highlights four key areas to watch in the global politics of critical minerals.

How will the second Trump administration continue reshaping US critical minerals diplomacy and project finance in 2026?

Since taking office in January 2025, the second Trump administration has put securing access to critical raw materials at the top of the US’ economic and national security agenda. The past year has exposed persistent US supply chain vulnerabilities to geoeconomic coercion, with Beijing successfully leveraging raw material dependencies in trade negotiations to negotiate tariff reductions.

Domestically, through 2025 the Trump administration has introduced a suite of policy tools designed to accelerate domestic production and processing of critical minerals. This has included expanding equity participation in companies producing and refining rare earths, lithium and gallium. The administration is also exploring price support mechanisms for selected materials, streamlining permitting and enhancing inter-agency cooperation to shorten project timelines. Federal financing provisions in the One, Big, Beautiful Bill include approximately $2 billion to strengthen the US stockpile of critical minerals through the National Defense Stockpile Transaction Fund, $5 billion for supply chain investments under the Industrial Base Fund, and $500 million in Defence Credit Programmes for critical minerals and related industries, counterbalanced by the phasing out of subsidies under the Inflation Reduction Act.

Internationally, the US has moved quickly to conclude bilateral critical minerals partnership agreements with partners including Australia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand and Ukraine. This bilateral approach represented a departure from Biden-era efforts to build multilateral alliances of like-minded states through initiatives such as the Minerals Security Partnerships anchored in the G7. While the US remains engaged with the G7 critical minerals roadmap and has proposed exploring price floor mechanisms for minerals like rare earths, the extent to which this will yield sustained multilateral coordination remains uncertain amid potential fracturing of transatlantic relations.

Can the European Union deliver financing at scale for critical minerals security in 2026?

Diversifying critical mineral supply chains has become a strategic priority for the European Union, with policy and legislative frameworks evolving rapidly over the past five years. The 2020 Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials and the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act established a framework to reduce dependencies, mitigate supply risks and strengthen the bloc’s economic resilience through domestic production and refining, alongside international partnerships.

Some progress towards these goals has been made. There has been modest diversification of supply and incremental gains in domestic capacity for minerals such as nickel and helium. Interest from partner countries across Africa, Asia and beyond remains strong, and new international cooperation instruments, including Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships, have been established. Most notably, the EU has selected 60 Strategic Projects targeting lithium, graphite, cobalt, nickel and rare earths, with a growing emphasis on processing. Of these, 47 are located within the EU and 13 externally, with partner countries including Canada, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Zambia. Most recently at the 2026 Future Minerals Forum, the EU also co-convened its first EU-Saudi Arabia Business and Investment Dialogue on advancing critical raw materials value chains, signalling ambition to broaden financing partnerships.

Yet while policy frameworks and partnerships continue to multiply, progress in scaling investment across the value chain has lagged. The RESourceEU Action Plan’s ambition to mobilise up to €3 billion by 2029 marks an important step, and EU institutions such as the European Investment Bank now have clearer mandates to support the sector. However, current financing volumes fall far short of what is required to meet the scale of the EU’s supply chain diversification challenge and rising demand.

Strategic project selection under the Critical Raw Materials Act also lacks clarity on financing structures, risk-sharing mechanisms and offtake support. In the absence of credible demand signals, such as price floors or long-term procurement commitments, including for green minerals, it remains uncertain how effectively project finance can be mobilised. This is particularly acute in a context where strategic competitors, notably China, may seek to undermine commercial project viability, and where the US is moving more rapidly to deploy state-backed financing tools. At the same time, new actors with appetite for financing critical minerals such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia are entering the market, increasing competitive pressure. Addressing these questions will be critical not just to incentivise industry but also to remain credible and competitive in international partnerships.

What will China’s 15th Five-Year Plan mean for global critical minerals supply chains?

As of 2026, China’s dominance across critical raw materials supply chains is well documented. Despite diversification efforts led by the US, the European Union, and other partners, China maintains its grip across key segments of the value chain, particularly in processing and refining. By 2035, China is projected to supply over 60% of refined lithium and cobalt, around 80% of battery-grade graphite and rare earth elements, and approximately 70% of battery-grade manganese.

Looking to 2026, a central question is how priorities set out in China’s upcoming 15th Five-Year Plan and associated sector-specific strategies will translate into domestic policy across production, processing, and recycling, and how they will shape overseas investment. Signals from Beijing point to sustained demand for strategic materials, driven by priority sectors such as new energy, new materials, aerospace and the low-altitude economy, alongside emerging technologies including quantum computing, biomanufacturing, hydrogen and fusion energy, and sixth-generation mobile communications. Trade policy priorities, including expanding trade in intermediate goods and green products, reinforce this outlook.

For developing countries, these dynamics will create both constraints and leverage. As competition for resources intensifies, some producer countries may be better positioned to negotiate improved terms on value addition, infrastructure development or technology transfer, particularly if China is compelled to share technology to secure supply. However, Beijing may also intensify efforts to strengthen domestic supply chain security through innovation, recycling, expanded exploration, and improved resource recovery. This may reduce its appetite for technology transfer – the key will be to understand what minerals and technologies China prioritises and why.

Understanding which minerals China prioritises, and the strategic rationale behind these choices, is also critical for the US, Europe, and other allies seeking to diversify and de‑risk supply chains. Mapping China’s evolving priorities helps to clarify where and how Beijing is likely to compete, what types of international partnerships it will pursue and what support is required to enhance the commercial viability of critical minerals projects.

Can resource-rich countries capture more value from critical minerals?

Leveraging mineral endowments for industrialisation through processing and value chain development has moved up sharply on the policy agenda of resource-rich countries. While ambitions to move beyond extraction are not new, the scale of global demand, combined with intensifying geopolitical competition, has created a moment in which producer countries are seeking to use strategic competition among buyers to negotiate greater value addition.

The African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy aims to align mineral development with broader industrialisation and sustainability objectives. At the national level, countries such as South Africa and Zambia have published strategies to capitalise on mineral endowments through downstream processing, manufacturing and the development of regional value chains. Similar debates are emerging across Latin America and Asia. At the same time, the range of actors engaged in these markets is expanding beyond the traditional players such as companies from China and Canada, with countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly seeking overseas investment, including across Africa and other resource-rich regions.

Negotiating greater value retention along the supply chain, through processing, technology transfer, shared infrastructure and participation in higher-value segments, will be central to these strategies. However, ambitions will need to be grounded in geological and market realities, including viability of resource exploration, price volatility, scale requirements, energy availability and infrastructure constraints. Success will also depend on how effectively countries leverage opportunities with different partners, as approaches to mineral cooperation vary significantly.

An additional layer of complexity arises from defence-related and strategic demand for critical minerals, as governments in major demand jurisdictions reassess which parts of supply chains they seek to onshore and which they remain willing to source externally. These shifts will shape the scope for producer countries to secure longer-term commitments and deeper forms of integration.