The United States chose its moment. On December 4, in Washington, Donald Trump hosted Paul Kagame and Félix Tshisekedi to endorse the peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda , the signing of a regional economic integration framework, and bilateral agreements between Washington and Kinshasa, on the one hand, and Washington and Kigali, on the other. But behind the diplomatic presentation, the American president clearly laid out the heart of the matter: “ This agreement creates a new framework for economic prosperity. There is immense wealth in this beautiful land. It is a beautiful land. But it has been badly stained with blood, enormous amounts of blood.  ” He quickly got to the point: “  Today, the United States is also signing its own bilateral agreements with Congo and Rwanda, which will open new opportunities for the United States to access critical minerals and provide economic benefits to everyone.” And we’re going to send some of our biggest companies to both countries. And we’re going to extract some of the rare earth elements, extract some of these resources, and pay. Everyone’s going to make a lot of money  .

From this point on, the framework for interpretation is established: peace between Kinshasa and Kigali is inseparable from a broader strategy of securing American access to the DRC’s strategic minerals, reconfiguring export corridors and repositioning itself in the face of the lead taken by China.

The Great Lakes region re-examined through the lens of the DRC-Rwanda partnership

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America  (NSS) of November 2025 confirms this approach. The document first addresses the Great Lakes region through the single case of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, presented as a conflict that Donald Trump claims to have ”  resolved  ” and which he cites to illustrate his peace diplomacy. In the Africa chapter, this pair serves as a prime example of the crises that Washington wants to pacify before establishing an investment agenda there, particularly in energy and critical minerals.

It is through a cross-reading of this NSS, the regional economic integration framework and bilateral agreements, that the American strategy appears most clearly.

A bilateral agreement to structure access to   Congolese ” strategic assets “

The bilateral agreement between the DRC and the United States is a long-term commitment. It obligates Kinshasa to ”  facilitate stable, predictable, and long-term access to critical minerals for American citizens and their allies  .” The United States justifies this arrangement by the need to preserve its national security, support its reindustrialization, and maintain its competitiveness in sectors deemed strategic: defense, energy, advanced technologies, and the automotive industry.

The timeline is tight. The DRC must establish an initial list of ”  strategic assets  ” within a month: critical minerals, gold, and unallocated exploration areas. This list, which is not yet finalized, according to our sources, is already undergoing technical work. It can be expanded at any time by either party. This core list will form the basis of a “strategic reserve of assets” to which the United States and its allies will have access. The DRC will grant American citizens a right of first refusal on this reserve. According to RFI, this work covers the entire country: it is not only the East nor solely the Katanga region (in the south of the country) that is involved in identifying minerals and unallocated reserves.

Ultimately , Kinshasa and Washington are considering the establishment of a ”  strategic mineral reserve  ” located in the DRC. Its purpose will be to guarantee the United States a predictable and sustainable supply of critical minerals, particularly cobalt, to strengthen Congolese capacity in national resource management, value stabilization, local processing, industrialization and job creation, but also to ”  promote resilience and equitable market-based approaches within global supply chains  “.

” To ensure that Kivu is not oriented towards the East but towards the West “

This agreement is also an American attempt to rebalance the share of Congolese minerals that currently go to China. At present, two main routes dominate: towards the Indian Ocean or towards South Africa, before largely supplying Asian markets. It is this geographical pattern that Washington intends to alter.

The Lobito corridor is at the heart of this effort. The goal is to ensure that a significant portion of the strategic minerals coming out of the African Copperbelt —which spans parts of Zambia and Katanga—goes to Lobito, and therefore to the United States and Europe, rather than to the Indian Ocean. “  The natural route for products that would otherwise pass through Rwanda is the Indian Ocean. And the Indian Ocean means China. It was essential, in the interest of the Americans, who are the sponsors of this regional economic integration framework, to ensure a supply chain that passes through the West. Because, for example, rare earth elements are also found in Maniema [ another province in eastern DRC ]. There is an iron ore project that would originate in Katanga and extend up to Maniema.” There is a road project that would run down through Bukavu, Uvira, Kalemie [ three cities in eastern DRC, located respectively in South Kivu and Tanganyika, editor’s note ] towards Katanga and join the Lobito corridor. This is about reversing the trend, ensuring that Kivu, which is rich, is not oriented towards the East but towards the West  ,” explains André Wameso Nkualoloki, current governor of the Central Bank of Congo and, previously, one of the DRC’s main negotiators in these deals with the Americans.

The United States also wants to capitalize on its large investment in the Sakania–Lobito rail corridor. To this end, at the request of the United States, the DRC and its state-owned enterprises plan that at least 50% of the copper volumes, 90% of the zinc concentrate volumes, and 30% of the cobalt volumes that they choose to market under their marketing and equity rights will be exported via the Sakania–Lobito corridor within five years.

For now, we are far from that. In 2024, according to Congolese authorities, Congolese mineral products exported through Lobito amounted to approximately 150,000 tons, while the DRC exports around 3 million tons of copper. For the investments made in Lobito to be profitable, more freight from the DRC using this corridor is needed.

According to our information, the United States insisted on including specific figures in the agreement. Clearly, this is a direct response to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the “new silk routes,” given that the DRC was the 45th African country to sign a cooperation agreement with China on this initiative. It is also, explicitly, a “corridor war.” With these investments, the DRC is permanently integrating itself into Western trade corridors.

The transatlantic front: Lobito at the center of the US-EU dynamic

Just one day after the conclusion of the DRC-US agreement, a joint statement of intent from the US government and the European Commission regarding the Lobito Corridor and investment in the Great Lakes region completes the framework. Both parties state their intention to ”  create the necessary conditions to increase US and European investment in the region, recognizing that economic development is a key pillar of long-term stability  .”

At the heart of this effort is, once again, the Lobito Corridor, described by the US-EU partnership as  a “transformative infrastructure project  ” designed to strengthen regional connectivity, secure supply chains for critical minerals, and stimulate sustainable economic growth. By linking the DRC to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, this corridor is presented as a tool to open “  new avenues for bilateral trade between Central Africa, the United States, and Europe  .” Washington and Brussels say they are working “  closely with private sector actors and African partners  ” to rehabilitate and modernize the corridor, acknowledging discussions between the private sector and the Congolese government regarding investments in the Congolese section. They declare themselves ready to examine financing options and to remain “  fully aligned and coordinated  ” to support the corridor’s success.

The American International Development Finance Corporation at the forefront

This strategy also translates into concrete financial instruments. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) announced on December 5 two letters of intent that deepen the United States’ strategic partnerships with the DRC and Rwanda ”  to foster economic growth, strengthen supply chain resilience, and consolidate mutual security and prosperity  .”

The first letter of intent concerns a proposed DFC equity investment in a joint venture between Gécamines SA, the DRC’s state-owned mining company, and Mercuria Energy Trading, a major international commodities group. This partnership aims to ”  boost the marketing of copper, cobalt, and other critical minerals to secure U.S. supply chains for these minerals  .” It also seeks to improve ”  transparency, competitiveness, and local value creation  ,” while facilitating access for the United States and its allies to materials from responsible sources.

The second letter of intent, signed with Mota Engil Engenharia e Construção África SA, supports the rehabilitation, operation, and transfer of the Dilolo–Sakania railway line in the DRC. The project could require up to one billion dollars in funding from the DFC after a full review. The objective is to connect this line to the Lobito Atlantic Railway in Angola and establish it as a strategic regional corridor capable of ”  boosting trade, attracting private sector investment, and strengthening the movement of essential goods and passengers in Central and Southern Africa  .”

“  These investments perfectly illustrate President Trump’s unprecedented commitment to peace. These projects will help secure critical supply chains, develop opportunities for the private sector, and strengthen U.S. global competitiveness, while supporting peace, prosperity, and dignity in Central Africa,  ” said DFC CEO Ben Black. The institution notes that these projects are part of a broader effort to “  diversify and strengthen global supply chains for essential raw materials  ,” reduce reliance on “ concentrated or unreliable  ” supply chains  , and ensure that U.S. industries have access to more stable and secure inputs.

Created in 2019 with bipartisan support under the presidency of Donald Trump, the DFC defines itself as the U.S. government’s international investment agency. It collaborates with the private sector to advance U.S. foreign policy and strengthen national security by mobilizing private capital in sectors deemed strategic, including critical minerals, modern infrastructure, and advanced technologies.

The MSP as a multilateral framework for the battle for minerals

This bilateral initiative is part of a broader framework:  the Minerals Security  Partnership  (MSP), a multilateral cooperation platform led by the United States that brings together producing and consuming countries around raw material supply chains. The MSP is a collaboration of fourteen countries and the European Union, designed to ”  catalyze public and private investment in responsible supply chains for critical minerals  .” It considers projects across the entire value chain (extraction, processing, refining, recycling) and primarily targets lithium, cobalt, nickel, manganese, graphite, rare earth elements, and copper. The United States emphasizes raising environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, local value creation, and transparency.

The DRC is already involved in several MSP activities, notably through processing and offtake agreements —  a type of agreement commonly concluded in the mining and oil and gas sectors—involving subsidiaries of Gécamines and groups such as the Belgian company Umicore or the Japanese company JOGMEC. The bilateral DRC-US agreement and the construction of the strategic asset reserve are part of this same strategy.

Kinshasa seeks to profit from the Sino-American rivalry

The DRC wants to capitalize on this rivalry. Closing itself off from the Americans to present itself as China’s  ”  preferred territory  ” would be dangerous for Kinshasa. ” We didn’t sign an agreement to replace one partner with another. The DRC’s position is that we have an interest in diversifying our partnerships. Collaboration with China continues ,  ” explains Daniel Mukoko Samba, Congolese Deputy Prime Minister in charge of the National Economy and signatory of the DRC-US strategic partnership. In 2023, China imported $18.7 billion worth of products from the DRC, primarily mineral resources. The DRC is ”  an important player in the China-US rivalry  ” and seeks to leverage it.

To achieve this, significant internal work remains. The United States expects concrete  actions  from Kinshasa: incentives, tax and regulatory adjustments, and special zones. The Congolese tax and legal framework is expected to remain the sole basis, but the DRC plans to offer special tax and regulatory advantages to American investors in certain areas. For example, the DRC has committed to amending its tax law within twelve months.

On the Congolese side, there are also expectations. As with China (identifying projects deemed capable of boosting development), a list of ”  strategic projects  ” must be drawn up with the United States. These will be ”  transformative initiatives  ” identified by the DRC as essential to its long-term development vision. This list is also expected within a month, and work is underway. These projects must be funded by American institutions.

To monitor the whole process, the two parties established a United States-DRC Economic Partnership Forum, which is to meet every two years, alternately in Washington and Kinshasa, as well as an intergovernmental dialogue aimed at deepening cooperation.

A complex and precise architecture for monitoring this cooperation

The United States and the Congolese side have designed an extremely close monitoring mechanism, centered around a Joint Steering Committee, which will hold its first meeting within 90 days of the agreement’s entry into force, and then two meetings per year, with the possibility of extraordinary sessions. This joint committee, composed of five American and five Congolese representatives, becomes the true control center of the partnership. It is responsible for examining each stage: investments, taxation, offtake , logistics corridors, transparency, and governance.

The U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa will also play a regular role: the DRC will be required to provide it with quarterly briefings on any decisions related to cobalt export quotas or bans. Similarly, a formal review of the tax incentives created for strategic projects must be conducted annually, within twelve months of the agreement’s entry into force. The partnership also includes a comprehensive review every three years, conducted jointly by both parties, to assess the overall implementation of the agreement.

Beyond this technical oversight, Washington and Kinshasa will create a Binational Economic Partnership Forum , a true political and economic forum, the first edition of which must be scheduled within 365 days of the agreement’s entry into force, and then held every two years, alternating between Washington and Kinshasa. This forum is intended to include the American private sector, which is expected to become a key component of the framework, particularly in logistics, energy, mineral exploration, and local processing.

The agreement also provides for the creation of a Coordination Committee for the Grand  Inga hydroelectric complex , with equal representation from both sides, tasked with monitoring the progress of strategic hydroelectric projects and securing the necessary financing. Mining projects included in the Strategic Asset Reserve will be subject to specific monitoring: the committee will be responsible for verifying the application of first-bid rights, negotiations, and the three-month renewable deadlines for reviewing each American offer. This entire framework reflects Washington’s desire to secure its partnership with the DRC politically, commercially, and strategically, placing monitoring and accountability at the heart of the relationship.

Transforming the Sino-American rivalry into a lever for development

These measures now need to be translated into national decisions. Congolese negotiators, contacted by RFI, are already mentioning the March parliamentary session as a way to accelerate legislative work and develop a clear roadmap. Congolese officials insist that they want to ”  benefit  ” from this deal.

“  This is a historic turning point; we must grasp its significance ourselves. Peace depends on our responsibility,  ” explains André Wameso. “  Until now, economic relations between Kinshasa and Washington were governed by a reciprocal investment promotion and protection agreement concluded in 1994. We have moved from one level to another  ,” emphasizes Daniel Mukoko Samba. In his view, “  the strategic partnership signed between the DRC and the USA represents a high level of political trust between the two governments, with aligned long-term objectives and interests  .”

André Wameso adds a warning that also sums up the credibility issue for the Congolese side: “  All of this can only work if we take it seriously. I’m being frank: they experimented with cooperation on our raw materials with Rwanda for thirty years, and it worked. Look at your iPhones and Samsung phones; the coltan comes primarily from us. If we want to enter into a serious strategic partnership with the Americans, we must be serious and show that we are capable of optimally supplying them with the mineral resources they need for their economy.  ”

In this context, the DRC remains, as some stakeholders in the matter summarize, a ”  key player in the China-US rivalry  .” The question now is whether Kinshasa will be able to transform this rivalry into a genuine driver of development, by leveraging the commitments secured from Washington, diversifying its partnerships, and its own capacity to define and defend a long-term vision.