Amid the tenuous ceasefire between Iran and Israel, signs are emerging that the Islamic Republic may be looking to China to restock its arsenals. This interest appears to stem from the rapid depletion of offensive and defensive Iranian systems during Israel’s June 13-24 attack, and growing dissatisfaction within Iran’s political and security establishment over the lack of tangible military support from Russia.

Since Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh’s visit to Qingdao for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in the immediate aftermath of the truce with Israel, speculation has intensified that Iran could turn to China for military hardware. Talk of such a potential shift, after years of dependence on Russia, has entered the mainstream in recent months, with Iranian political figures openly suggesting that Beijing could supply advanced defense systems.

 

A flurry of claims

Rumors of new arms transfers first emerged in July, with reports that Iran had received Chinese-made HQ-9B surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries. The supposed deliveries were claimed to involve a barter deal whereby Iran had compensated China with crude oil. Beijing, however, issued a swift denial via its embassy in Tel Aviv.

Nevertheless, the story still gained traction in Iran. Several Reformist-leaning outlets reported that Tehran had acquired not only missile batteries but also long-range surveillance radars and high-end electronic warfare (EW) systems. Though Iranian state media stayed silent, the reports may be testing the waters for deeper military cooperation with China.

If China was to emerge as a supplier, it would not be the first time. In the 1990s and 2000s, Beijing allegedly sent missile components, gyroscopes and dual-use materials. More recently, Chinese vessels have this year delivered materials that Iran can use to make missile propellant.

Importantly, Iranian military-linked media have also laid the rhetorical groundwork for a shift in tactical aviation. In the week following the ceasefire with Israel, Defa Press—an outlet affiliated with Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff—touted the Chinese J-10C fighter jet, highlighting the aircraft’s capabilities, proven service with Pakistan and potential to replenish Iran’s worn-down fleet. On Sept. 23, hardline MP Abolfazl Zohrevand went further, claiming that China would soon supply HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile systems.

While no official announcements have followed, the Defa Press article has coincided with increasing disillusionment with Russia, Iran’s hitherto primary defense partner. This is particularly as Moscow appears ready to sell high-end gear to India, but not Iran, leaving Iranian officials seemingly ready to overcome earlier distrust of Chinese hardware.

 

Iran’s post-truce urgency

The potential Iranian interest in Chinese missile systems and fighter jets must be understood in light of the heavy toll exacted by the June war. Satellite imagery suggests that Iran’s air defense network—a mix of Russian, Chinese and domestically-made systems—was badly damaged, especially in western regions and near nuclear sites. For Tehran, the implications are stark. Its ability to deter or respond to further incursions has been compromised, and its procurement decisions now reflect that urgency.

The HQ-9B is one of China’s top SAM platforms, equivalent to the Russian S-300, and could improve Iran’s defenses against high-altitude threats. The system would not only plug a critical operational gap but also expand Iran’s area-denial capabilities along key borders and critical infrastructure.

Similarly, the J-10C multirole fighter could be a transformative addition to Iran’s air force, representing the first modern, high-end fighter jet to be purchased in decades. Though far from matching the fifth-generation warplanes of adversary states, the J-10C could allow Iran to put up a challenge at the local level, especially when deployed in numbers and integrated into a more modern command-and-control architecture.

In this context, the Iranian parliament in early September approved a bill that channels fresh resources to the military, including funds earmarked for purchases of major foreign weapons systems. The move underscores Tehran’s determination to rebuild its arsenal after the June war, with particular interest in acquiring advanced platforms from abroad.

 

Strategic pivot or temporary diversification?

A pivot to China would not just entail a stopgap solution, but a deeper recalibration of Iran’s procurement strategy after decades of relying on Russian systems and North Korean know-how.

Farzin Nadimi, a Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), believes that Iran’s growing openness to Chinese systems stems from “losing hope it can obtain any military hardware from Russia.” The delay in Moscow’s long-anticipated delivery of Sukhoi-35 (Su-35) fighter jets and focus on New Delhi have left Tehran with a sense of being sidelined. In this context, Chinese systems may be increasingly viewed as technically competitive.

“Chinese platforms now enjoy a better reputation than they did a decade ago,” Nadimi told Amwaj.media, adding that they are more likely to be offered as complete packages “that can interoperate—hardware, software, radars, air defence, and fighter jets.” Tehran’s fragmented arsenal has long made interoperability and local adaptation top procurement priorities.

Nevertheless, Tehran made little use of the 2020 expiry of the UN arms embargo under the terms of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—partly due to longstanding mistrust toward the quality and reliability of Chinese hardware. That hesitation began to erode after the performance of Chinese J-10C fighters during Pakistan’s recent skirmishes with India, which reportedly impressed Iranian military planners.

From Beijing’s perspective, however, arms transfers to Iran remain a diplomatic and economic tightrope. Andrea Ghiselli, Lecturer at the University of Exeter and head of the ChinaMed Project, is skeptical that China is prepared to supply such systems anytime soon. Although Iran may have raised the topic, Ghiselli views Beijing’s calculus as continuing to favor restraint, saying, “China seems not ready to do more than it already does: diplomatic protests, buying oil, and providing components for missiles.”

Notably, China’s defense ties with Iran have historically leaned toward the indirect, a dynamic that still weighs heavily on Chinese calculations. “There is no need for China to act provocatively with the US and Israel,” Ghiselli charged, mindful that overtly backing Tehran could also jeopardize Beijing’s expanding relations with Gulf Arab states. While mild regional instability can serve Chinese interests by diverting US attention and justifying criticism of western interventions, Ghiselli warned that “true turmoil is bad for Chinese companies.”

 

Between rumors and restraint: What comes next?

A potential Iranian pivot to Chinese weapons could materialize as a major realignment, or revolve around symbolism. At the heart of this ambiguity is a more profound reality: China has every reason to back Iran strategically, but few incentives to do so visibly. As such, any support is most likely to be covert or otherwise remain below the threshold of escalation with the US, such as shipments of dual-use goods.

If China were to act more boldly, it would be stepping into an environment fraught with geopolitical risk. US forces are heavily involved in the region, with Washington reasserting its security commitments to Gulf Arab allies following the Iran-Israel war and the Israeli bombing of Hamas officials in Qatar in September. Meanwhile, Israel is watching China’s moves closely, which could have played a role in the Chinese embassy in Tel Aviv being the diplomatic outpost to deny reports of arms transfers to Tehran. At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s recent mutual defense pact with Pakistan underscores how Tehran’s rivals are also broadening their security partnerships, further complicating Iran’s calculations.

For Iran, the strategic rationale for diversification is clear. While China may offer a more sophisticated—and politically flexible—option, it would come at a cost. Ghiselli explained to Amwaj.media that Beijing is already Tehran’s top oil customer, giving it leverage but also limiting the Iranians’ ability to negotiate on equal footing. In the end, next steps will depend on whether speculation around Chinese systems turns into concrete deals—or remains part of Tehran’s apparent signalling amid its broader post-truce recalibration.