ASTANA — The panel Central Asia: Influence, Autocracy and Balancing Russia, organized by the Royal Society for Asian Affairs in London on Nov. 6, explored the shifting dynamics of the United States policy toward Central Asia under Donald Trump’s second term

Critical minerals at the heart

Associate fellow at Chatham House Annette Bohr opened the session by arguing that after years of limited U.S. focus, “Trump 2.0 is bringing the region back into view.” According to her, it is largely because of convergent interests in connectivity and critical minerals.

According to her, the U.S. Geological Survey identifies 54 critical minerals essential to America’s economic and national security, including 17 metallic elements known as rare earths. These are indispensable for magnets used in automotive, electronics, and defense industries, as well as in renewable energy production.

“China currently controls roughly 90% of the world’s rare earth elements and produces between 60 and 70% of them. That level of dependency makes the U.S. vulnerable, which is why Washington is looking closely at Central Asia,” Bohr said.

Bohr emphasized Kazakhstan’s central role because it has proven reserves or active production of about half of these critical minerals, including copper.

“Kazakhstan ranks 11th globally, and in chromium, it is the second-largest producer. It also supplies roughly 40% of the world’s uranium and about 25% of U.S. uranium imports,” she added.

While uranium is officially classified as a fuel rather than a critical mineral, Bohr noted that it remains strategically vital. Most of the region’s critical minerals are still exported in raw form, often routed through China or Russia for processing. She highlighted that Kazakhstan recently opened a tungsten processing facility in the Almaty Region, a sign of growing capacity.

“Tungsten is critical for the defense industry, and the U.S. government is supporting a private American company’s bid for Kazakh tungsten deposits in competition with Chinese bidders, even though China currently produces four-fifths of the global supply,” Bohr said.

From Washington’s perspective, she continued, improving access to critical minerals in Central Asia not only reduces dependency on China but also “strengthens trans-Eurasian connectivity and supports the sovereignty of the region’s states.”

For Central Asian governments, Bohr said, “the hope is that the C5+1 summit that took place on Nov. 6 will spur economic diversification beyond hydrocarbons, facilitate technology transfer and local capacity building, and help balance relations with China, Russia, and the United States.”

Trump’s foreign policy 2.0

Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center Temur Umarov said that the summit and the visit of Central Asian leaders to Washington can be interpreted as “the U.S. making a comeback in Central Asia.”

“There’s a lot of symbolism here: it’s the tenth anniversary of the C5+1 format, and President Trump has invited all five Central Asian leaders to Washington, D.C. For some, this is their first visit to the U.S. capital as sitting presidents,” Umarov said.

He acknowledged that skeptics might argue symbolism doesn’t always lead to tangible results, but noted that “geopolitics is always infused with symbolism, and attention from the U.S. president alone gives these countries more leverage in their dealings with traditional allies, primarily Russia and China.”

Umarov also drew a contrast between Trump’s approach and that of previous administrations.

“From the perspective of Central Asian regimes, this is a welcome development because under the Biden administration, engagement was pragmatic, but trust was limited. The U.S. tried to engage without pressuring the region to take an anti-Russia or anti-China stance, yet the legacy of institutions like USAID, Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe blurred the lines between genuine U.S. policy and old Cold War structures,” he said.

“Trump’s approach comes without that baggage. It makes it more comfortable for Central Asian leaders to engage, and they hope this will translate into real opportunities for cooperation that enhance U.S. presence as a counterbalance to Russia and China,” Umarov continued.

However, he warned that the future remains uncertain. While economic opportunities exist, he said, the challenge is “not reluctance from Central Asian governments, but structural: weak institutions and insufficient guarantees for international investors.” “Optimism about U.S. engagement doesn’t automatically mean change on the ground,” he added.

Washington’s uncertain role

Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow Dr. Luca Anceschi offered a far more skeptical assessment.

“When it comes to the U.S. as a partner in Central Asia, economically or politically, there’s a lot of skepticism. The unpredictability of U.S. policy, combined with the region’s post-Afghanistan reality, makes Washington largely irrelevant in the day-to-day strategic calculations of Central Asian states. In fact, when I teach Central Asia politics, I rarely mention the U.S. at all,” he said.

Anceschi described the Central Asia–U.S. summit as “more symbolic than substantive.”

“It gives Central Asian leaders legitimacy and an opportunity to showcase their agendas, but it doesn’t amount to a coherent policy framework. I don’t see this or the next U.S. administration maintaining a consistent, long-term regional policy comparable to Russia or China,” he said.

He warned that deprioritizing democracy and human rights may yield short-term stability but “over time erodes accountability and legitimacy.”

“Some might argue that we’re witnessing the end of Central Asia being treated merely as an appendix to Afghanistan, perhaps. But even now, the renewed focus on critical minerals seems less about the region itself and more about counterbalancing China. That’s not strategy; it’s reflex,” he said.

Obstacles and opportunities in the critical minerals game

Returning to the question of critical minerals, Bohr outlined three major challenges that could slow progress. First, she said, potential pushback from Russia and China is likely, particularly if cooperation involves dual-use technologies or geospatial surveying. Second, the main challenge is “converting declarations into tangible progress.”

“The U.S. has long expressed interest in developing critical minerals with Central Asia, yet concrete steps have been limited. Central Asian states want more than investment: they want technology, domestic processing capacity, and market access,”  she said.

Bohr noted that building midstream capacity, the ability to refine and process locally, requires “integrated strategies combining finance, production, processing, and transport infrastructure.”

“This has traditionally been harder for the U.S. to achieve than for Chinese or Russian state companies. However, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation is ready to co-finance midstream projects, and the Export-Import Bank can cover long-term debt. Whether that translates into real progress depends, in part, on U.S. political will,” she said.

The third obstacle, according to her, lies in transport: Central Asia’s limited infrastructure constrains trade with the U.S., especially as Washington seeks energy market access while bypassing Iran and Russia.

“The Middle Corridor linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the Caspian has doubled cargo volumes in recent years, but still falls short of the northern route through Russia,” she said.

Bohr added that, with Trump’s recent trade deals with Thailand, Vietnam, and Australia, it remains unclear where Central Asia fits into this broader picture.

“But one thing is clear: Trump is determined to reduce U.S. reliance on China, especially as Beijing begins to weaponize critical materials. That creates an opening for tools like the Export-Import Bank and the Development Finance Corporation to finally give Central Asian countries tangible avenues for cooperation, something that hasn’t really happened before,” she said.

She also reminded that while the Middle Corridor is operational, it cannot be isolated from competing interests.

“China has invested about $4 billion in Iran and remains heavily dependent on Iranian oil. So, these corridors can ultimately strengthen China–Iran ties. Europe, too, cannot isolate the benefits, others will profit from the same infrastructure. Meanwhile, the promised 12 billion euros [US$13.8 billion] from the European C5+1 summit in April remains largely unallocated,” she said.

Central Asia: a unified front

Moderator Sophie Ibbotson asked whether any specific Central Asian countries stand to gain more from Washington’s renewed focus, or whether the benefits are collective. Umarov noted that Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are receiving noticeably more attention, given their size and economic capacity.

“This is a comfortable platform any country can use. And over the years, it actually makes more sense. Central Asian countries get along with each other now; they have a clearer vision that sticking together helps attract more attention and investment,” he said, stressing that this cooperation is not competitive.

“While Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan may attract more attention, all five states benefit collectively. The C5+1 platform allows them to leverage individual engagement for regional advantage, intertwining national and collective interests,” he added.

Bohr agreed, adding that “other countries do not see this as competition; they try to leverage the situation as effectively as they can.”

“Central Asian states are increasingly acting as regional actors in their own right, something they couldn’t do before. Even if initiatives like critical minerals development remain uncertain, they are already taking steps: gallium is now being extracted in Uzbekistan, which Trump even mentioned recently in Australia,” she said.

Bohr concluded that summits like these enhance the agency of Central Asian countries.

“Agency comes not only from maintaining relations with Russia, China, the EU, Turkey, and the U.S., but also from defending their own interests, even saying ‘no’ when necessary. That’s where Trump’s unpredictability can actually work in their favor. It’s risky, but it creates opportunity,” she added.

She emphasized that middle-power countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan now possess far more room to maneuver than they did during the first Cold War.

“Power is far more diffuse now, no longer concentrated solely within NATO or the Warsaw Pact. Influence can emerge from unexpected places, and meetings with Trump can yield tangible foreign-policy benefits, even if the domestic optics are just as useful,” Bohr concluded.