China is investing billions to stitch together the Horn of Africa with a regional network of roads, ports, and pipelines. In response, the US’s strategic interests face an evolving challenge in this pivotal gateway to the continent, writes Tewodros Woldearegay.

The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor is a flagship regional infrastructure project that could transform East Africa through increased connectivity and economic integration. The corridor spans Kenya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and links with Uganda, and has been built with the intention of unlocking the trade and developmental potential of these countries and the broader region.

LAPSSET features several key components: a 32-berth port at Lamu in Kenya that will serve as a major maritime hub; a interregional railway linking Lamu with Isiolo, Nakodok, Juba (South Sudan), Moyale, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Nairobi (Kenya); highways running parallel to these rail lines; and oil pipelines moving petroleum from South Sudan and Ethiopia to the Kenyan coast. Additionally, the project also includes the development of resorts, industrial parks, power infrastructure, and international airports along the corridor.

Strategically, the LAPSSET Corridor aims to drive regional connectivity and economic integration by connecting landlocked countries to the coast to boost trade and facilitate investment. This infrastructure ensemble is designed to create one seamless East African economic zone.

The project comes at a time of ongoing Sino-US rivalry in Africa. Historically, the US had a relatively modest investment in Africa, but it has recently increased its involvement through programs such as Prosper Africa, Power Africa, and the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. These have an emphasis on private sector-driven projects, sustainable infrastructure projects, job creation, and good governance as part of the US efforts to counterbalance China’s growing influence on the continent. This rivalry adds a complex dimension to the implementation and broader political dynamics of the LAPSSET Corridor.

China’s role and influence in the LAPSSET Corridor

China holds significant sway in East Africa. One of the most visible aspects of Chinese involvement is the investment and construction leadership in major infrastructure components, especially the Lamu Port. The port’s first berths were constructed by the China Communications Construction Company, a major Chinese state-owned enterprise, with Chinese financing covering a substantial portion of the project cost. This deep-water port, when completed with all planned 32 berths, will be one of the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa and is central to the LAPSSET project.

The LAPSSET Corridor fits into China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which seeks to improve global trade routes through massive infrastructure investments. By integrating LAPSSET into the BRI framework, China strengthens its economic and logistical connections with East Africa, ensuring a foothold in a region crucial for shipping lanes and resource access.

Geopolitically, China’s motivations are multifaceted. Beyond economic returns, China aims to secure supply chains, access to natural resources, and cultivate strategic partnerships that counterbalance Western (especially US) influence in the region. By embedding itself in the infrastructure backbone of East Africa, China also enhances its soft power and strategic leverage.

US interests in the Horn of Africa

The United States has long-standing influence in the Horn of Africa, dating back to the post-World War II era when Ethiopia became a cornerstone of American strategic presence. The US established military, naval, and intelligence facilities, such as the Kagnew communication station near Asmara, to monitor Cold War adversaries and project power regionally. During the Cold War, the United States first backed Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie by supplying military assistance and created alliances aimed at preserving stability and limiting Soviet expansion. However, following the rise of the Marxist-Leninist Derg regime in 1974, the US redirected its support to Ethiopia’s regional opponents to counter Soviet-backed influence in the region. In the post-9/11 era, US military presence deepened with the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, focusing on counterterrorism, capacity building, and regional stability amid threats such as al-Shabaab and extremist groups.

In view of China’s rise in the region, the UK is keen to maintain access to critical military bases like Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, secure international shipping lanes, counter terrorism, and retain influence in a geopolitically pivotal region. China’s infrastructure diplomacy and economic integration efforts threaten to reorient regional alliances and trade routes, potentially limiting US strategic options.

To counterbalance China, the US needs to enhance diplomatic engagement, increase security cooperation with regional partners, and pursue economic initiatives that offer alternatives to Chinese investment.

Is the Build Back Better World initiative an effective response?

The Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative was launched by US together with the G7 countries as a values-driven infrastructure partnership. It aims to counter China’s BRI and projects like Kenya’s LAPSSET Corridor by offering high-standard, transparent investments in climate, health, digital technology, and gender equity. Despite its ambitions, B3W faces significant challenges that undermine its effectiveness as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence in East Africa and globally.

Firstly, B3W lacks the scale and speed of deployment that characterises the BRI. China’s BRI is already entrenched, with over 2,600 projects valued at £2.75 trillion across Asia, Africa, and beyond. These include hard infrastructure such as ports, railways, and pipelines – precisely the kinds of projects B3W is less focused on. In contrast, B3W emphasises “soft” infrastructure like health and digital connectivity and promotes private-sector funding, which is slower and less predictable than China’s state-backed financing and construction dominance. This leaves B3W less competitive in delivering large-scale physical infrastructure in a timely manner, critical for projects like LAPSSET.

Secondly, B3W suffers from unclear funding commitments and coordination issues among G7 members, which reduces credibility and limits its appeal to developing countries. The initiative is perceived more as a framework or values-based partnership rather than a fully operational global infrastructure financier with concrete projections of capital flow. This uncertainty contrasts with China’s well-established and state-coordinated financing mechanisms that accelerate project implementation.

To maintain geopolitical influence and counter China’s rise, the US and its partners must evolve beyond B3W’s current limitations. A way forward involves increasing direct, large-scale investment in hard infrastructure projects that align with green and sustainable standards, while ensuring more predictable financial commitments. Strengthening regional partnerships in East Africa and offering competitive, transparent financing with capacity-building support will make alternatives to BRI and LAPSSET more attractive. Additionally, integrating diplomatic, security, and economic strategies cohesively to support regional development and governance reforms can reinforce US strategic dominance amid the Sino-American rivalry.

The Sino-American rivalry in the Horn of Africa will intensify as China expands its influence through the BRI and LAPSSET. While the US retains military and security dominance, this position faces growing challenges from China’s infrastructure diplomacy. Although the B3W initiative in its current form is not a perfect counter, with focused improvements and sustained commitment, it could emerge as a credible means for the US to uphold its strategic interests in East Africa and beyond.

Photo credit: computerwhiz417 used with permission CC BY-NC 2.0