This commentary is the second installment of a new column from the Africa Program called the Dizolele Brief, which connects the dots between seemingly disparate events and developments in Africa.

This week President Joe Biden delivers on his promise to visit Africa from the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit and becomes the first sitting U.S. president to visit Angola. The trip happens at the tail end of the president’s term, as he will step down in 50 days, raising questions about the impact of the trip.

Timing aside, Biden’s visit is welcome. Such a presidential visit last happened a decade ago in July 2015 when former president Barack Obama visited Kenya and Ethiopia. The gap between Obama’s visit and Biden’s trip to Angola effectively undermined U.S. official pronouncements that Africa mattered. For Africans, the dissonance between discourse and actions reinforced the sense that Africa was not a priority for the United States.

U.S. presidential visits to African countries often have been justified by some democratic progress. The U.S. presidents’ visits are often cast as a reward to African leaders who have demonstrated that they have learned and applied the right lessons in democracy and good governance—the good students. In a few other cases, a visit rewards a leader’s commitment to the defense of Western security and economic interests. Thus, a visit by a U.S. president is perceived as an endorsement by the United States and the West.

Angola’s Journey with the United States

Biden’s visit signals a commitment to a region whose importance has long been understated. And given Angola’s circumstances and contentious and brutal history with the United States, this visit is long overdue. The United States and Angola were on opposite sides of the Cold War. First, during the war of independence against Portugal, which pitted Angolan nationalists against each other with the backing of the United States, the Soviet Union also drew in the armed forces of Cuba, Zaire, and South Africa. Independence degenerated into a 27-year civil war that ended in 2002 with the killing of Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the U.S.-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, known as UNITA.

In a development reminiscent of U.S.-Vietnam relations, Biden’s visit is the culmination of the rapprochement between Angola and the United States that started more than 30 years ago. The two countries only exchanged envoys and opened embassies in 1993. As it was in Vietnam, many Angolan leaders, including President João Lourenço, trained in the old Soviet bloc or Cuba. Many of the rising senior civil servants and emerging leaders of the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)’s party structures studied in Cuba, often starting at an early age in primary school. They are ideologically Cubans.

For President João Lourenço, the visit is the apex of his career. He has watched the rapprochement unfold from the beginning when his predecessor Eduardo dos Santos, who ruled Angola for 38 years, initiated the process. He has served in different capacities as a general, political commissar, provincial governor, senior MPLA cadre, and minister of defense. In this latter capacity, he visited the Pentagon in 2017, furthering rapprochement. Six years later in 2023, he visited the White House as president. He has continued to strengthen bilateral relations, which range from defense and security to infrastructure investment.

A Fragmented Country

In Washington, D.C., the rapprochement has led to exuberance about “flipping” Angola to the U.S. side. While there is cause for celebration, it is important to keep these developments in perspective. Angola’s leadership is fragmented into several camps, which include the Luso-Angolans (whites and mestizos); generals (war veterans); securocrats from the intelligence and affiliated services; and rising anti-imperialist, Cuba-trained civil servants. Accordingly, tensions have risen between those who, like Lourenço, promote engagement with the United States and the MPLA’s pro-Russia camp. Other quarters question the value and benefits of a partnership with the United States. Changes in the defense and security sector, which has benefitted from support from the old Soviet bloc, have increased these tensions as Lourenço accepts U.S. training and capacity-building programs. The president also plans to purchase U.S. equipment to upgrade the military and diversify away from Russia, a step that affects Angola-Russia relations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Africa Command have been building a strong relationship of trust with the Angolan counterparts. But Angola is not necessarily ready to “flip.” On November 10, 2024, an Angolan delegation visited Moscow, signed security agreements, and acquired telecommunications and information technology equipment.

On the political front, Angola has achieved important gains since independence in 1975 and the end of its civil war in 2002. The country, however, is grappling with the consequences of an incomplete peace process that has not addressed the root causes of the two wars, undermining the much-needed national reconciliation. MPLA’s winner-takes-all approach to governance created an influential wealthy elite that resists the changes that are required for the economic development of the country as these would threaten their interests. The changes include anti-corruption measures, facilitating international private investment, and opening political space. The unfinished peace process gave way to a regime of intolerance that brooks no dissent and rejects different political perspectives and criticism.

Lourenço secured his second and last term in 2022. But he is facing growing public discontent. Like the rest of Africa, Angola’s population is young, with a median age of 16. While the war legacy continues to shape the country’s politics, most Angolans did not participate in the civil war and do not subscribe to the war discourse. They have grown impatient with the ruling party and expressed their frustration at the ballot box. For instance, while MPLA won the 2022 election, it was UNITA that won in the capital city of Luanda. UNITA’s strong showing means that MPLA will face more popular opposition in the next presidential election.

The president’s popularity among Angolans has fallen due to unemployment, the rising cost of living, insecurity, poor health infrastructure, and nepotism. The anti-corruption initiative he launched in his first term is seen as an effective way for the president to silence and neutralize his enemies and potential challengers. It is also an extension of identity politics that drives political and economic power among Angolan elites.

China and Russia

Angola has large critical resource reserves, including oil and diamonds, with a wide network of waterways. As sub-Saharan Africa’s second-largest oil producer, it pumps 1.16 million barrels of oil a day. The country, however, has accumulated $66 billion (about 70.3 percent of its GDP) in debt. It owes China, its largest creditor, $17 billion. The country diverts an estimated two-thirds of its oil production to service the debt to China.

The coverage of the trip has focused on the Lobito Corridor, the flagship investment of the Biden administration in Africa. The rail and port infrastructure, which is financed through the G7’s $600 billion Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, seeks to increase western access to critical mineral reserves in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia. Expectedly, the Lobito Corridor project has generated a lot of interest due to the potential upside it offers for the parties concerned. Critics of the project, however, charge that it is as extractive and exploitative as the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Whereas the Chinese exports the minerals via the Indian Ocean, the corridor will do the same but via the Atlantic.

The corridor project, however, presents a collaboration opportunity between the United States and China, two adversaries who are key and indispensable investors in the corridor, without whom the project cannot succeed. China dominates the mining sector in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, and the critical minerals supply chain. Time will tell whether the two adversaries will cooperate.

It is impossible to discount Russian influence in Angola. The Soviet Union guaranteed the MPLA’s victory during the wars. Russian companies have invested in the extractive industry, particularly diamond mining. Russia enjoys substantial soft power and goodwill as most Angolan generals and many civilian elites have been educated in the Soviet Union and speak Russian.

Unequitable Governance

A visit to Angola easily reveals the inequitable distribution of resources. Post-civil war infrastructure projects that Angola financed thanks to billions of dollars the country borrowed from China are built in the southern regions, such as Benguela, Huambo, Huíla, and Namibe. The capital city of Luanda has also benefited from new infrastructure projects, including transportation infrastructure, housing, and other goods and services. The northern provinces of Cabinda, Uíge, and Zaire, have not received the same level of attention from the government even these regions contribute enormously to Angola’s wealth. For instance, the northern provinces of Zaire and Cabinda produce 55 percent and 35 percent of Angola’s oil revenues, respectively. This disparity in public service investment is a key driver of public discontent.

As Biden visits Angola and engages with the leadership, the Angolans will be watching whether he raises this disparity and related human rights abuses and civic rights infringements. They are keen on seeing how U.S. investment in the country, such as the Lobito Corridor, differs from China. They will scrutinize the gap between pronouncements and actions. The success of this engagement will depend on the U.S. commitment to center these bilateral relations on the Angolan people, not João Lourenço, MPLA, or the government.

To learn more about Angola, please read the Africa Program’s report.

Mvemba Phezo Dizolele is a senior fellow and director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.