This week, former President Donald Trump secured the necessary electoral votes for reelection, and Vice President Kamala Harris conceded the race. Many observers throughout the Americas are wondering: What does the election mean for the region’s rule of law? For trade and economic development? Which countries are poised to benefit? Which will face new challenges?

To answer these questions, Global Americans gathered 12 leading regional scholars for their brief perspectives on how a second Trump term will influence Latin America’s governance, economy, and the millions of people who call the region home. Their answers reflect Latin America’s diversity of interest and ideologies, and shed some light on which countries can expect to be the major winners and losers of this election.

Javier Corrales, on Democracy and Rule of Law:
(Professor and Chair of Political Science, Amherst College)

“Donald Trump has two dominant political leanings that help predict possible interactions with Latin America and the Caribbean. He can be transactional and he can be dogmatically punitive.
Trump will expect nations to transact with the United States, but only in a few areas that matter to him: migration, drug trafficking, and business deals favoring his business allies. If nations are willing to transact with him in these domains, they will get along with Trump. He will care less about issues of governance: quality of institutions, political freedoms, the rule of law, labor and environmental standards, inclusive development, women’s rights. And if there is no deal, he will be punitive. He likes to give the impression of being the angriest one in the room, even the madman, if there is no win for him. He will use threats promiscuously.

Trump will also help boost extreme populism in the region. Far-right populists will draw inspiration and fuel from him. We saw this already with Bolsonarismo and Bukelismo under Trump 1.0.
But extreme far-left populists (the anti-imperialist camp) will also gain from having Trump in office. All forms of populism thrive by referencing an external enemy. Left-wing populists love to rant about the United States. Trump will be a gift for populists looking for the image of a raging, capitalist bully in Washington.  In short, these are going to be favorable years for both right- and left-wing populist forces.”

Evan Ellis, on U.S.-China Competition in Latin America:
(Research Professor, US Army War College)

“The second Trump administration will likely continue the policies of the first, pushing for transparency, a level legal playing field, and strong partner institutions for evaluating and overseeing acquisitions, contracts, and projects with Chinese companies. It will provide government and independent information about the risks that Chinese projects may pose to our partners’ own interests, based on their past performance, predatory practices, and contracting approach. The administration will likely continue to strongly push back against Chinese infrastructure that can be used against the U.S. in times of war, such as in the ports and space sectors. It will similarly push back against Chinese digital penetration and human networks that create unacceptable risks of espionage and IP theft. It will likely leverage the private sector in a fashion less constrained than its predecessor, in order to provide alternatives that are more likely than the Chinese offering to be successfully completed without major quality, environmental, social conflict, and other difficulties, based on rational business cases, and which provide enduring value added for our partners. It will likely team more with the companies, banks and governments of like-minded democratic partners such as Taiwan, Korea, Japan, UK, the EU, Canada and India to provide solutions to complement those available through the US.”

Francisco Monaldi, on Oil and Commodities:
(Director, Latin America Energy Program, Rice University)

“Trump should be positive news for the oil industry in the region. He is firmly pro-fossil fuels and critical of decarbonization policies. He will promote primarily the U.S. oil industry, but indirectly that would favor the region’s industry. He cares about the price of oil not being too high that hikes gasoline prices and inflation, but not too low that affects domestic oil production. He will use his influence in Saudi Arabia and Russia to achieve that goal. That would help the oil sector in the region maintain its profitability. Particularly shale oil projects in Argentina and the offshore in Guyana. As an ally of President Milei, he will promote U.S. investments in Argentina’s oil sector, as he did in his first term. He will likely resume the approval of LNG export projects that Biden suspended, which will benefit projects in Mexico. He will not pressure the region to move away from fossil fuels and will champion the sale of U.S. refined products in Latin America. One question mark is Venezuela, where it is unclear if he will harden oil sanctions or have a more transactional approach. Another one is if he would use Mexico’s dependence on U.S. gas and refined products to extort concessions from the Mexican government. “

Jorge Mariscal, on Mexico:
(Experienced Chief Investment Officer and expert in emerging financial markets.)

“Among the countries in the Americas, Mexico stands to face the biggest challenges from a second Trump presidency. Protectionism in trade and migration were two central pillars of Trump’s successful presidential campaign. It remains to be seen how much of the campaign trail rhetoric translates into actual policy. But even if just a fraction of Trump’s plans is implemented, one can expect a meaningful negative impact on nearshoring investment (especially by Chinese companies seeking to export to the U.S.), exports, and remittances. There could also be humanitarian concerns derived from mass deportations. Trump could press Mexico to effectively become a “retention wall” for illegal migrants from Mexico and Central America, and to get the Mexican government to up its game to fight organized crime. Ultimately, Trump’s protectionism injects uncertainty to the scheduled review and ratification of NAFTA in 2026. The external risks from the Trump administration compound domestic uncertainty caused by recent reforms in Mexico that erase institutional checks and balances, grant unlimited power to the president and the ruling party, and potentially undermine the rule of law. All this translates into higher country risk. Mexico’s economy, already slowing palpably in the second half of this year could teeter into recession in 2025.”

Julio Borges, on Venezuela:
(Former President of the National Assembly of Venezuela)

“The entire region is undergoing a transition between weakened democracies and authoritarian currents, with the most conspicuous cases being Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba; accompanied by a growing presence of non-Western forces like China, Russia, and Iran. Therefore, Latin America needs a comprehensive plan for the United States and the West to regain influence in the region. There are indications that Trump has this geopolitical angle on his radar.

For Venezuela, a vital case for the entire region, Donald Trump’s victory implies a tremendous expectation for political change in the country among Venezuelans. This expectation partly explains the substantial support for him in Florida and the Latino vote in general, where Trump is seen as a fighter against left-wing populism and authoritarianism.
The case of Venezuela embodies the three most threatening variables across the region: radical democratic backsliding, the emergence of an organized crime-state alliance, and massive migrations. These three variables are present, to varying degrees, in all countries and are evolving into a chronic issue.

Regarding options for Venezuela, there are two possibilities: increased pressure to fracture a fully deteriorated regime or heightened pressure to negotiate a transition. Some suggest a third type of negotiation from President Trump: coexisting with Maduro in exchange for oil and migration stability. Notably, Maduro and his inner circle have already publicly signaled openness to this path. However, I find this third option unviable for several reasons: 1) The most conservative wing of the Republican Party would oppose it, 2) Cuban-American leaders close to Trump, who hold significant influence, know this strengthens the Cuban regime, 3) A coexistence negotiation risks support from Florida’s Latino voters and the backing of leaders like Milei, Bukele, and Bolsonaro, who are combating strong leftist forces in their countries, and 4) Personally, Trump has ties to Venezuela and its political change. Given that this would be a non-reelection term, it’s possible to envision Trump focusing on his legacy regarding political change in Latin America.”

Georges Fauriol, on Haiti:
(Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium)

“The Trump administration’s accession to office will coincide with what remains of the negotiated timetable for Haiti’s transition to democratic governance by early 2026. The dismal security, political, and economic reality in Haiti implies the need for immediate action, driven by: the inconclusive record of the Transitional Presidential Council (TPC) created with much hope last April, and probably a lack of enthusiasm by a Trump White House with the wobbly path currently being explored to modify the Multilateral Security Support operation (MSS), currently led by Kenya, into a conventional UN peacekeeping operation (PKO). The recent jump in lethality, and operational scope of action by Haitian gangs suggests that inserting the MSS and upgrading Haitian National Police (HNP) capabilities are insufficient. With the backdrop of recent U.S. campaign messaging about “border control”, let alone “Haitians”, U.S. policy could take a focused approach, mandated in part by a regional policy principle to take the fight directly to the drug cartels, their Haitian allies, and related lucrative trafficking networks. This would include the insertion of specialized U.S. private contractors – a concept already in place with the recent contracting of US-based Studebaker Defense Group, as well as a miscellaneous other foreign trainers working with the HNP. This clarity of commitment would presumably indicate to Haiti’s political leaders that Washington expects positive outcomes from their end as well.”

Scott MacDonald, on Brazil:
(Chief Economist at Smith’s Research & Gradings, Senior Advisor at Global Americans, and member of the Caribbean Policy Consortium)

“Donald Trump’s victory was greeted with trepidation in Brazil. Although the two countries are close trade partners and the North American country is the South American country’s largest foreign investor (reaching a record $29.4 billion in 2023), President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s center-left government and the incoming rightwing Trump administration are likely to have their differences. Brazil under Lula has sought to maintain a neutral foreign policy based on multilateralism, de-dollarization in international trade, and a willingness to engage with China and Russia through the BRICS organization. Brazil has also diverged from U.S. policy on Gaza and the Russo-Ukrainian War. Venezuela has provided another vexing issue, though Lula’s veto of Venezuela’s membership bid at the recent BRICS summit has drawn Brasilia and Washington a little closer.

Brazilian-U.S. relations could be complicated by personal differences between Lula and Trump. Lula had a positive relationship with President Biden, sharing opinions on human rights, climate change and energy transition. His relationship with Trump is likely to be more challenging, considering the U.S. leader’s views on China’s role in Latin America, penchant for protectionism and lack of concern about climate change, not to mention his cordial relationship with Lula’s hard-right rival, former president Jair Bolsonaro. This portends a more complicated yet still cordial relationship.”

Sergio Guzman, on Colombia:
(Director and Co-Founder, Colombia Risk Analysis)

“Trump’s victory marks the potential end to the bipartisan U.S.-Colombia relationship. We expect the personal relationship between Trump and Petro to be cathartic, turbulent and focused on trading social media barbs. We foresee three main impact areas: drug trafficking, peace and security; migration; and the economy. Trump’s stance on Colombia’s coca cultivation will likely strain ties, as President Gustavo Petro’s administration resists forced eradication policies, increasing tensions. Trump is unlikely to support Colombia’s peace negotiations with armed groups, which could lead to reduced U.S. aid for combating these groups. On migration, Trump’s “America First” policy could trigger mass deportations, forcing many migrants, including Colombians, back to Latin America, creating an unforeseen migrant wave to Colombia and potentially triggering conflict between Petro and Trump. Economically, Trump’s tariffs will likely disrupt global value chains, affecting inflation forecasts and trade with partners like Colombia. Notably, the environment will not be an area of focus in the relationship as Trump and Petro hold opposing views on environmental policy, climate change, and energy transition.”

Jorge Damian Liotti, on Argentina:
(Editor-in-Chief of the Politics Section at La Nación)

“The triumph of Donald Trump is particularly significant for Argentina’s president Javier Milei for several reasons. First, because Milei has shown a clear preference for him, based on the idea that both share similar style of leadership: outsiders, anti establishment, disruptives, very critical of traditional media and journalism. They also share ideology and values, such as rejection of any version of socialism and of the woke agenda (gender, climate change, global health). Second, because Milei thinks that Trump could be supportive of Argentina in the IMF (the country is the heaviest global debtor of the organization). Trump was very relevant in 2018 to force the IMF board to give a US$40.000 million loan to Argentina. Third, because in a Latin American context defined by left-wing leaders (Lula, Boric, Petro, Maduro), Milei envisages he can become the best regional ally of Trump.

On the other hand, there are some topics that could be thorny for the relationship. First, Trump’s promise to implement protectionist measures collides with Milei´s open markets stance, and can also affect some Argentine exports. Second, Milei wholeheartedly endorses Zelensky pleas for western help against Russia, while Trump seems more prone to finish the war with some territorial concessions. Third, Trump could be more assertive than Biden in his demands for Argentina breaking apart from China, the main buyer of its grains and soya.”

Patricio Navia, on Chile:
(Clinical Professor at NYU and expert in Latin American democratization and electoral systems.)

“The return of Trump to the White House will force Chile to prepare for turbulent times. As Trump might engage in an important trade war with China, Chile will be in the uncomfortable position of seeing its most important ally among world powers fight Chile’s most important trade partner. If we get lucky, Chile won’t be forced to take sides. The U.S. has a free trade agreement with Chile and Chileans enjoy visa waiver benefits to enter the U.S. Many Chileans invest in the U.S. and many members of Chile’s elite attend college and graduate schools in the US. But China is our most important trade partner. A full blown trade war between China and the U.S. would be the worst possible scenario for Chile.

Given that Argentine President Milei has strong connections with Trump, Chile will need to work hard not to lose ground among the U.S.’s allies in the region. Fortunately, Chile is a more reliable historic trade and political partner than Argentina. But given President Boric’s limited interests in promoting foreign investments, his government’s policy priorities that have adversely affected U.S. companies (including the pensions reform) and his strong defense of Palestine, it does not seem that Trump and Boric will become close friends. It is in Chile’s best interest to remain on good terms with the U.S., but there are significant downside risks in the horizon now that Trump will return to power in 2025, at least until President Boric leaves office in early 2026.”

Juan Diego Solis de Ovando, on Ecuador:
(Program Associate and Author at Global Americans)

“As Ecuador faces a new Trump administration, President Daniel Noboa’s government must prepare for an uncertain future, marked by economic sensitivity and an escalating security crisis. With Ecuador’s next presidential election approaching next year, Noboa’s administration must navigate the immediate impacts of U.S. policy shifts. Ecuador’s use of the U.S. dollar since the early 2000s makes it particularly vulnerable to shifts in U.S. economic policy. If Trump pursues a protectionist agenda, Ecuador’s export-dependent economy could see adverse effects, impacting inflation and financial stability.

Without a free trade agreement, Ecuador must seek alternative ways to secure favorable trade conditions with the U.S., especially in agriculture and manufacturing sectors. On the security front, U.S. support has been critical in addressing narcotrafficking and organized crime. Given Ecuador’s current security issues, maintaining this collaboration will be essential, though Trump’s “America First” approach could limit U.S. commitment.

Looking forward, Ecuador should prioritize migration and development cooperation as vital elements of its relationship with the U.S. While these issues are crucial for Ecuador’s long-term stability, Trump is unlikely to invest significant resources or attention into them. Strengthening security collaboration and negotiating preferential trade conditions will be critical to weathering potential economic shocks and ensuring Ecuador’s security remains a priority in U.S. policy, despite Trump’s ‘America First’ agenda.”

Allison Fedirka, on Paraguay:
(Director of Analysis at Geopolitical Futures and Latin America specialist with nearly 20 years in geopolitical risk and forecasting.)

“Trump’s presidency opens the path for closer U.S.-Paraguay relations. Paraguay has been a U.S. ally for years, particularly with recognizing Taiwan and fighting transnational crime and terrorism. Combating China arguably ranks as one of Trump’s top foreign policy issues and Paraguay can present itself as a steadfast regional ally at a time when many Latin American countries have strong economic ties with Beijing. Security cooperation targets both drug trafficking and illicit financing of groups like Hezbollah, both of which compliment Trump’s interest in securing borders and reigning in Tehran. The stance on Taiwan and security cooperation coupled with Paraguay’s economic reforms and hydroelectricity production positions Paraguay as a strong candidate for serving as a U.S.-allied AI and digital hub as it meets many of the security and economic needs for such a hub. This also aligns with Trump’s professed interest in technology development. The challenge for Paraguay is to position itself in a way that it can hold the administration’s attention long enough to advance cooperation in these areas. This challenge is not unique to Paraguay given the new administration faces many competing foreign policy demands, including war in Ukraine and Israel.”

Global Americans takes pride in serving as a platform that offers in-depth analyses on various political, economic, environmental, and foreign affairs issues in the Western Hemisphere. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Americans or anyone associated with it, and publication by Global Americans does not constitute an endorsement of all or any part of the views expressed.