With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?

The Sahel region includes Nigeria, one of the continent’s largest economies, and nine other countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.

Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude.”

While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the Western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.

• expansion of investments in critical minerals;
• resolution of the ECOWAS crisis (triggered when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali decided to exit the Economic Community of West African States); and
• increased arms sales.

This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for ECOWAS in Abuja, Nigeria.

Let’s look at these one by one.

First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.

US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.

This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.

The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.

In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.

Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the ECOWAS crisis.

Following military coups, the ECOWAS regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. ECOWAS even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.

If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.

Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “savior” of ECOWAS integration.

This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.

Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.

The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of Western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted Western military.

Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.

For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.

Bumpy road ahead

China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.

There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.

This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.

It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.

Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade, is a faculty member of the Department of Political Science, Lagos State University.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.