Over five years, Japarov has delivered stability and economic growth: average annual GDP growth of around 9 percent, the nationalization of the Kumtor Gold Mine, and an ambitious slate of infrastructure projects.

But the cost has been high: democratic backsliding, repression of media and activists, and closer alignment with authoritarian partners, such as Russia and China. Unlike neighboring Kazakhstan under Kassym-Jomart Tokayev or Uzbekistan under Shavkat Mirziyoyev – where elite consolidation unfolded over decades – Japarov has attempted to force the process at speed, risking renewed instability.

Kyrgyzstan, once hailed as an “island of democracy” in the region, is now following the broader trend of authoritarian consolidation, emerging more centralized, less pluralistic, and more vulnerable to external shocks – from the war in Ukraine to mounting debt to China.

Japarov’s Rise to Power and the “Khanstitution”

Sadyr Japarov’s ascent to power in 2020-2021 was among the fastest in modern Central Asian history. It was an accelerated, yet textbook, example of a recurring pattern in Kyrgyzstan, in which street protests radically reshape the political landscape.

The trouble began with the October 2020 parliamentary elections, tainted by mass allegations of vote-buying and fraud. Protests in Bishkek quickly escalated into the storming of the White House, forcing President Sooronbay Jeenbekov to resign. Amid the chaos, a crowd freed Japarov from prison – a nationalist from the Issyk-Kul region, sentenced in 2017 for the kidnapping of an official during protests against Canadian company Centerra Gold, which at the time managed the Kumtor mine. Within weeks, Japarov had become prime minister and, following Jeenbekov’s resignation, acting president, deftly consolidating power.

The decisive moment came in January 2021. Japarov won the presidential election with 79 percent of the vote amid an opposition boycott and accusations of unfair practices. At the same time, a preliminary referendum showed public support for a presidential system. The final blow to the parliamentary model came with the April referendum on the new constitution. With a dismal turnout of around 37 percent and numerous complaints of violations – vote-buying and pressure on voters – the document was approved by 79 percent.

The new constitution reduced parliament from 120 to 90 seats, vastly expanded presidential powers – including the appointment of judges, security chiefs, and ministers without parliamentary consent – and weakened checks and balances. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and Human Rights Watch sharply criticized the draft for undermining the separation of powers and human rights. Inside Kyrgyzstan, the document quickly acquired its nickname: the “Khanstitution,” a nod to a return to authoritarian rule, where a leader governs like an absolute khan.

The reform paved the way for further consolidation. Parliament became a compliant instrument: the snap elections of November 30, 2025 were held amid record-low turnout (36.9 percent) and the absence of real opposition, with pro-presidential forces securing over 80 percent of seats. OSCE observers noted systemic violations, including pressure on independent candidates.

What began as a revolutionary push against corruption and clan politics ended in the creation of a super-presidential system, with power concentrated in the hands of one man and his inner circle.

Political Consolidation and Democratic Erosion

Over the five years of Japarov’s rule, Kyrgyzstan has undergone a profound political transformation. As human rights defender Dinara Oshurahunova, head of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, noted: “Since the constitutional reform, the human rights situation has changed significantly. Almost none of the constitutional norms are respected. Everything is violated — especially the section on rights and freedoms: the right to information, private property, [and] access to information.”

Consolidation rests on the tandem of Japarov and his closest ally, Kamchybek Tashiev, head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). They are often referred to as the “two friends.” Under Tashiev, the GKNB has become a state within a state. New initiatives – such as draft legislation allowing security services to shut down mobile communications – and the seizure of assets, including telecom companies, internet providers, and the Elcart payment system under presidential administration control, have strengthened total oversight.

Oshurahunova described the scale bluntly: “Extortion has reached unprecedented levels. Businesses are simply taken over or forced to make enormous payments. Real corrupt officials live as they always have — only now they pay tribute.”

The opposition has been effectively dismantled. Since 2021, dozens of politicians, activists, and journalists have faced charges under vague provisions – “incitement of hatred,” “extremism,” or “calls for unrest.”

“Arrests happen in groups,” Oshurahunova said. “Cases are opened out of thin air, accusations are fabricated, and no one even tries to prove them.”

A recent example is the designation of Kloop as an extremist outlet: defense lawyers were denied access to case materials; a CD was stapled to the file, and a flash drive simply “went missing.”

The Kempir-Abad case – over 50 arrests based on decontextualized recordings – showed how any criticism was being reinterpreted as a call to seize power. Among those targeted were Mahabat Tazhibek kyzy (the wife of journalist Bolot Temirov), Rita Karasartova (for reposting a letter), and Ravshan Jeenbekov (over the Koi-Tash events). Human Rights Watch has documented more than 100 politically motivated arrests since 2021.

Media freedom and civil society have deteriorated sharply. Laws on “foreign agents” (2023–2024) and “protecting traditional values” shuttered dozens of NGOs. Independent news outlets such as Kloop, Azattyk, and Temirov Live faced blocks and criminal cases. Reporters Without Borders dropped Kyrgyzstan from 72nd place in 2020 to 122nd in 2025. Freedom House reclassified the country from “partly free” to “not free” in 2024.

Oshurahunova summed it up: “The state is allowed everything — steal, kill, arrest. Citizens are allowed nothing. Not a single constitutional right is guaranteed.”

Fear and self-censorship now dominate society. In Bishkek and the regions, people lower their voices. “People don’t know what to say because they don’t know what they might be accused of,” Oshurahunova said. Even experts fall silent; lawyers refuse cases after colleagues are arrested. The most active segments of society – journalists, rights defenders, bloggers – have been hit hardest.

The roots of this erosion stretch back to earlier years.

“The ground was prepared under Atambayev – the foreign agents law in 2013, [and] the arrest of Tekebayev opened Pandora’s box,” Oshurahunova said, referring to the initial, albeit failed, effort in 2013 to pass a foreign agents law, and the 2017 arrest of Kyrgyz opposition leader Omurbek Tekebayev.

Japarov merely scaled up the pace and scope of authoritarian consolidation “rapidly and massively,” added Oshurahunova.

In 2024, Kyrgyzstan finally adopted a law targeting foreign-funded NGOs.

Even discussions of restoring the death penalty – blocked by courts but potentially subject to a referendum – underscore how constitutional barriers no longer restrain power.

Kyrgyzstan, once proud of its reputation as Central Asia’s democratic outlier, now looks like a typical resident of the neighborhood: centralized authority, silenced dissent, and fear of open criticism.

Economic Results and Social Costs

Japarov’s rule has brought impressive economic growth – but with serious costs and risks. Economist Azamat Akeneev emphasized a numbers-first approach: “Economists can rely only on figures and verified data. And the data show that Kyrgyzstan has achieved very significant economic success over the past five years.”

Average annual GDP growth from 2021 to 2025 stood at around 9 percent, peaking at 10.2 percent in the first 11 months of 2025. The state budget nearly tripled – from roughly 200 billion soms in 2021 to over 600 billion in 2025. Capital investment surged, particularly in construction, which has grown by 30-40 percent annually since 2022. The state became the dominant economic actor: the State Mortgage Company leads housing and construction, investing in roads, schools, and administrative buildings – where once a few were built, now hundreds rise. The financial sector, especially banks, posted “extraordinary” growth in deposits, lending, and profits, under tight regulation by the National Bank.

GDP per capita rose from about $1,200 in 2021 to over $3,000 in 2025, moving Kyrgyzstan from the World Bank’s poorest category into the lower-middle-income group. This shift altered international assistance: grants gave way to concessional loans. The success was reinforced by Kyrgyzstan’s 2025 Eurobond issuance – $700 million raised amid $2 billion in demand at a 7 percent yield. Rating agencies responded optimistically, despite historical risks.

The presidential system enabled rapid decisions.

“Under a parliamentary system, making a quick leap is difficult,” Akeneev noted.

“Under a presidential system, electricity tariffs began to rise,” despite their unpopularity, he said. This helped address the energy crisis via rolling blackouts in public institutions and rising utility prices – measures previously blocked for years by public outcry.

Compared with its neighbors – Kazakhstan’s roughly 4-5 percent growth in 2025 or Uzbekistan’s steady 6-7 percent under Mirziyoyev – Kyrgyzstan’s surge is more volatile and heavily dependent on external factors, including the war in Ukraine. Tajikistan’s growth, at around 7 percent, has been steadier, without the risks of overheating evident in Kyrgyzstan.

“The economy is already overheated,” Akeneev warned. “There are sectors where bubbles have inflated – construction and trade.”

Bishkek now has the highest housing prices in Central Asia, fueled by relocated Russians and easy credit. The garment industry boomed in 2022-2023 on the back of exports to Russia, but declined in 2025 amid renewed competition and new Russian restrictions. The state has monopolized key sectors – alcohol production (a 100 percent state monopoly since 2022), insurance, mining (with mandatory state stakes), and international internet access – undermining competition in a country once defined by the power of its small business sector.

Poverty remains at around 25 percent, while inflation of 6-9 percent erodes incomes. Food, fuel, and utility prices are rising faster than teachers’ and doctors’ wages. Remittances – equating to 15-20 percent of GDP – have declined following tighter Russian controls, including after the Crocus City Hall attack in 2024. External debt exceeds 50 percent of GDP, while domestic debt is rising rapidly. Unlike Kazakhstan or other oil-rich states, Kyrgyzstan lacks reserves; spending is balanced on temporary revenues.

“We spend what we earn,” Akeneev concludes. “If there is a downturn, how long can the state maintain balance?”

Japarov’s economy delivered visible stability and infrastructure, but at the cost of monopolization, inequality, and vulnerability. Without diversification and buffers, today’s “golden growth” could turn into tomorrow’s cliff – spelling a hard fall, especially for the most vulnerable.

Foreign Policy: Balancing Between Giants

Japarov has preserved and deepened Kyrgyzstan’s traditional “multi-vector” foreign policy over the last five year – but with a clear tilt toward Moscow and Beijing.

Political analyst Temur Umarov stressed the continuity: “Kyrgyzstan’s foreign policy autonomy remains in the hands of the country’s leadership maintaining strong, trust-based relations with Russia and expanding China’s presence. Under Japarov, this trend has accelerated, but fundamentally the format remains unchanged.”

Foreign policy is shaped by objective dependencies – economics, migration, trade, and energy – with the goal of creating stability for domestic priorities. 2025 marked record diplomatic activity: Japarov visited over 10 countries, traveling three times to Russia and Tajikistan, twice to China, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and the United States.

Relations with Russia reached a peak. President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Bishkek in March, Japarov’s participation in Moscow’s Victory Day parade in May, bilateral talks in July, and the Eurasian Economic Council meeting in December underscored strategic alignment. Kyrgyzstan plays a visible role in circumventing Western sanctions – bringing in revenue but also risk.

“We see a clear tilt toward Russia,” Umarov noted. “Japarov tried to please Putin and did not hide it.”

In December, Japarov received the International Leo Tolstoy Peace Prize for contributions to regional security – a symbolic gesture from Moscow.

With China, the focus is economic. A state visit in February and participation in the SCO summit in late summer advanced major projects, including the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, with key financing agreements signed in 2025. Beijing remains Kyrgyzstan’s largest creditor, raising debt concerns.

“With China, [Japarov] hasn’t fully found common ground,” Umarov said. “There is a lack of mutual understanding.”

Early ties between parts of the elite and Chinese business – often involving corruption – created risks where personal interests could outweigh national ones.

Relations with the West are pragmatic but cool. Japarov’s participation in the U.N. General Assembly in September and the C5+1 summit in November with Donald Trump have maintained relations, and Japarov secured a share of the 12 billion euro pledged by the EU at the Samarkand summit in April. But Japarov rejects pressure over sanctions.

“With the West, things are bad,” Umarov said. “From the start, he didn’t understand how to work with the [U.S.] State Department or the administration.” With Trump’s return, cautious re-engagement has begun, including outreach to global media, but trust remains low.

Regionally, achievements are notable: border demarcation with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, cemented through trilateral summits and reciprocal visits.

Umarov sees adaptation. Japarov is “learning to play by Central Asia’s rules” and becoming a predictable partner.

Dependencies cut both ways: Russia needs Kyrgzy migrants at the same time migration to Russia gives Moscow leverage over Kyrgyzstan; meanwhile, Moscow-Beijing competition benefits Bishkek.

“For Kyrgyzstan, development is only possible when both [Russia and China] are present,” Umarov concluded. “It needs at least two to have an alternative.”

In a multipolar world, such balancing brings short-term gains but deepens long-term vulnerability for a small, mountainous republic.

Conclusion

The effects of Japarov’s power over the course of five years are evident across Kyrgyzstan, but most clear in the capital, Bishkek, a city I see every day. There are new roads and high-rises on the outskirts where old five-story blocks once stood. Markets and cafés where political arguments once raged are now dominated by whispers, with people wary of being overheard. The smog that was always there is still present, but now disappears from sight as the city plunges into darkness at 10 p.m. to save electricity.

As a journalist from Bishkek, I stood on these streets in October 2020 when crowds broke down the doors of the White House, when they freed Japarov and he promised an end to corruption and clan rule. At the time, the “Khanstitution” seemed like a necessary compromise for stability: parliament weakened, the presidency strengthened, and the country exhaled after a decade of repeated revolutions.

I was in Batken, on the border, sharing sleepless nights with soldiers while shots were fired in my direction in 2021. I personally witnessed the signing of the historic demarcation agreement that closed the chapter of unresolved Soviet-era borders in the region in 2025. Seeing how many sacrifices ordinary people endured, I understood why change felt necessary.

But today, in January 2026, looking at empty squares after the November 30 elections – where pro-presidential parties took 80 percent of the seats without real opposition – I see the price.

I was at the Hyatt Hotel where election results were announced, after speaking with Edil Baisalov, deputy prime minister under Japarov’s government, about contemporary Kyrgyzstan. The economic leap – GDP growth, Eurobonds, hundreds of buildings under construction – is real, by his account. But it is fragile, experts warn: overheated real estate and trade bubbles, poverty, inflation eating into salaries, and dependence on Russian remittances and re-exports.

Politically, the country has changed irreversibly.

Oshurahunova speaks for many of us: “The state is allowed everything the citizen is allowed nothing.”

Arrests in the Kempir-Abad and Kloop cases, business extortion, foreign agents laws – this is not an erosion but the destruction of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. Externally, Japarov balances skillfully – visits to Russia, talks with Xi, the C5+1 with Trump – but internally, the state is ruthless toward its own citizens. There is no balancing within Kyrgyzstan’s polity.

Walking these streets, I think about how the revolutions of 2005, 2010, and 2020 taught us that people can change the system. I was a schoolgirl in 2005 and saw Bishkek in ruins. I was a student in 2010, trapped at university as an uncontrolled crowd hurled stones into classrooms and stormed the White House. By 2020, I witnessed it all again as a journalist.

If repression continues and the economy falters – whether from sanctions, a downturn in Russia, or a larger global calamity – the next explosion may be uncontrollable. Kyrgyzstan has become like its neighbors: stable on the surface but boiling within. When the kettle boils over is impossible to say, but it’s not just the khan’s hand that will get burned.