How is Nigeria preparing for FOCAC?
In about four months, all African countries – minus Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) – shall converge on Beijing for the ninth Forum of China-Africa Cooperation. I consider the 2024 FOCAC historic because it is the first to be hosted in China since its eradication of extreme poverty in 2021; and if there is any country that should show more interest in tapping from the immense opportunities of this South-South platform, it should be Nigeria, one of the world’s poverty capitals. It is also the first after the COVID-19 pandemic, and would no doubt build on the optimism of the 3rd Belt and Road Initiative forum of last year, which dovetailed into a busy year of China-Africa relations.
Therefore, not only should we be reviewing the implementation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Dakar Action Plan (2022-2024) established at the last FOCAC in Dakar, Senegal, in 2021; but we ought to also be working hard for Nigeria to host the next FOCAC in Africa, 2027.
The creation of FOCAC 24 years ago was a response to African leaders’ request, who were seeking more coordination in their bilateral relationships, and, in my view, leveraging their people’s sense of solidarity for liberation, shared with China as they hope to escape the poverty trap. Ministerial conferences of the FOCAC take place every three years and are held in China and Africa alternatively – the first one was in Beijing in 2000. The triennial meeting not only focuses on economic cooperation but covers other areas of interest like diplomacy, peace and security, development cooperation and cultural exchange.
Nigeria’s partnership with China through FOCAC has resulted in the execution of vital infrastructure projects across the country, valued at over $5bn in the last decade. And when Vice President Kashim Shettima, who represented President Bola Tinubu, attended the BRI in Beijing last year, he concluded agreements with Chinese partners for new projects valued at $2bn, as well as letters of intent between the Chinese and Nigerian partners for new projects and investments worth $4bn. Additionally, the Federal Ministry of Works also signed an MoU with China Harbour Engineering Company Ltd for the construction of the Lekki Blue Seaport contract at the Lekki Free Trade Zone in Lagos.
There are also success stories in other parts of Africa. According to data from Development Reimagined, an independent African-led international development consultancy, there are agreements for investments in road upgrades in Zambia, a new industrial park in Mozambique, a digitally networked cement factory in Uganda, among others. There were trade and tourism promotion conferences, Chinese medical teams, agreements on broadcasting and new agricultural ventures. There were also financial transactions signed which showed that commitments at FOCAC 2021, Dakar, are coming on stream – investments into Afreximbank and Africa Finance Corporation, and Egypt’s issuance of a “panda bond”, to name a few.
“Each month over the past year, we have recorded at least 50 Africa-China activities, in some cases over 100. This might seem like an overly positive picture of 2023. The questions are: what was missing from 2023? What might be rectified in 2024?” Hannah Ryder, CEO of Development Reimagined, said.
But it is not only about infrastructure and the discussions of loans that go with it, for which today some analysts are unduly worried that China is “turning off the tap.” The visits of over 20 African leaders and foreign ministers to China, last year alone, were focused on re-engaging China on economic growth on the continent. They want concessional lending in energy and transport and investments in value addition and manufacturing, and they also want the finalising of new export agreements for African products to China. All these interests and expectations should guide our preparation for FOCAC.
Interestingly, there is a method for FOCAC. In order to coordinate, come up with and track feasible commitments, the Chinese side has established a FOCAC Follow-up Committee consisting of 28 Chinese departments and agencies led by the State Council. The three core ministries for FOCAC implementation are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Finance. The African side is less centralised, involving actors in Beijing and African capitals. To coordinate FOCAC-related issues, just a few countries have specific offices for FOCAC follow-up, such as South Africa and Ethiopia– both have hosted FOCAC – while other countries may only have a specific desk to organise China-related affairs.
I am of the view that Nigeria should create a bureaucratic instrument for engaging this process. It will set a standard for other African countries to birth a concentric implementation platform for achieving some of the outcomes from Dakar, like the China-Africa Cooperation Vision 2035, and the Sino-African Declaration on Climate Change. FOCAC follow-up could inspire further policy adjustments to help us localise the gains of the BRI, and also innovate fronts for people-to-people exchange.
Furthermore, to prepare for FOCAC, Chinese and African senior officials meet one year before the next ministerial meeting. In Beijing, the African diplomatic corps are expected to meet with China’s follow-up committee every two or three months to discuss specific issues related to China-Africa relations and FOCAC and then consult with relevant departments in their capitals. Chinese ambassadors and economic and commercial counsellors in African countries also engage directly with African local communities and report back to the follow-up committee.
We must therefore keep an ear to the ground, and see what methods and policies best align with the Chinese agenda for the next FOCAC. Interestingly, based on the 2021 FOCAC outcomes and the three new initiatives on industrialisation, agricultural modernisation and talent that were announced at the China-Africa conference in South Africa on the sidelines of the BRICS meeting, we can also see a clear path to a robust conversation. The focal point should be agriculture. Over 70 per cent of Nigerians engage in the sector mainly at a subsistence level, yet they are not able to feed the nation. This is why we should tap into China’s proposal for agricultural modernisation through climate-smart innovations and technological support.
In addition, the stakes are high, and Nigeria cannot shy away from the question of how strategic we can be as a regional heavyweight. FOCAC has several sub-forums in fields such as agriculture, education, culture, technology, youth and entrepreneurship. We should take advantage of the fact that FOCAC could become a seamless development paradigm to serve the global community. For instance, an annual China-Africa Poverty Reduction and Development Conference usually co-hosted by the United Nations Development Programme and the International Poverty Reduction Centre of China was upgraded to a FOCAC sub-forum in 2015. According to the UNDP, these sub-forums often involve interactions with non-governmental organisations, businesses and academics, especially from China.
It is the job of the government to mobilise its citizens to carry forward traditional friendship, deepen solidarity and cooperation, and open up new space for accelerating the common development of China and Africa. In my view, Nigeria stands to gain more from the FOCAC promise, more than other African countries, not only because of what we have but who we are. The government must therefore show more ambition, and make the moment count. China is also in partnership with other regions and economic blocs, so the truth is that we may actually be in competition with other people who might be more eager to engage. This means that we must be determined to extend our hand in order to meet China halfway.