In a time of rising global economic competition and geopolitical tensions, Africa has become a strategic region for investment, particularly concerning critical minerals. Critical minerals—including cobalt, lithium, nickel, and rare earth elements—are vital for modern technologies ranging from electric vehicles (EVs) to renewable energy infrastructure, and they play a key role in the global energy transition. The World Bank predicts that by 2050, the demand for clean energy technologies will increase the production of certain critical minerals including graphite, lithium, and cobalt by 500% compared to 2018.¹ China and the United States, as the world’s two largest economies, are highly motivated to secure these resources to fuel their technological and economic ambitions. In 2023, China’s total economic engagement in Africa is calculated at $21.7 billion under the Belt and Road Initiative.² Estimates suggest that $8-10 billion of these engagements are focused on critical mineral projects.³ According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. invested $7.4 billion in Africa in 2023, estimating U.S. critical mineral investments to be just under $300 million, a mere 4% of total U.S. investments on the continent that year. ⁴⁵ Overall, China holds the largest critical mineral portfolio on the continent by far as Beijing continues to pursue access to critical minerals.

Drivers of Chinese Critical Mineral Investments in Africa

The green energy transition drives China’s demand for critical minerals, making it a focal point in China-Africa bilateral relationships. China, as a signatory to the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, is prioritizing clean technology investments to reduce reliance on pollutant-heavy commodities. To make this possible, China imports a significant amount of critical minerals, much from Africa, which feed directly into key industries under China’s clean tech development policies.

In November 2020, China released its “New Energy Vehicle Industry Development Plan (2021-2035),” calling for the accelerated development of new EVs and promoting the “development of the entire value chain of power batteries” encouraging enterprises to improve their ability to secure key resources such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, and platinum.⁶ Three years later, China defined the “new three” as a significant driver for economic growth, with a particular emphasis on enhancing foreign trade. The “new three” technologies are electric vehicles, as well as lithium batteries and solar photovoltaic commodities, all dependent on critical minerals.

These policy initiatives require Chinese enterprises to strengthen supplier networks for critical minerals, and Africa plays a key role in fulfilling this demand. In 2020, China imported nearly 90% of its cobalt from the DRC, and in 2024, Côte d’Ivoire was China’s third largest supplier of nickel ore.

Priority Minerals and Key Projects

Africa holds a vital position in the critical mineral industry, leading China to prioritize mining and mineral investments in the region. In 2023, China’s copper-related projects were worth just over $2 billion in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and nearly $2 billion in Botswana, and other large projects related to metals and mining collectively accounted for over $1 billion more, including lithium mining in Mali and Zimbabwe.⁷

While China is reliant on Africa to supply critical minerals, Africa equally depends on China, which serves as the largest center for importing, refining, and processing global critical minerals. China accounts for 85-90% of global rare earth element mine-to-metal refining and processing of these materials,⁸ creating a mutual dependence in the relationship. For many of Africa’s exports of critical minerals, China is the largest importer- 72% of cobalt, 28% of graphite, and 58% of manganese, etc.⁹ China maintains a comparative advantage as the global processor and refiner, further securing its access to African critical minerals for its domestic industries, while leaving Africa limited in choices for diversifying its export markets.

Drivers of U.S. Critical Mineral Investments in Africa

Similar to China, the United States needs critical minerals to support its strategic agenda including economic, security, and clean energy goals. The U.S. uses critical minerals in an array of sectors, from EVs to fighter jets. In 2024, the Select Committee on China reported that Beijing supplied more than 50% of U.S. demand for 24 critical minerals, including more than 90% of demand for rare earth elements from China.¹⁰ American officials have emphasized how this reliance, “poses a dire economic threat to U.S. national security.”¹¹ As U.S.-China competition intensifies and supply chain dependence is weaponized, as seen with recent Chinese export restrictions on gallium and germanium, the United States is increasingly concerned about supply chain disruptions, especially for defense industries.

Gallium and germanium, two critical minerals essential for semiconductor production in the U.S., have been primary examples of retaliatory disruptions by China via export controls. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the 2024 Chinese export controls on gallium and germanium could cost U.S. GDP $3.4 billion and stunt U.S. access to materials essential for high-tech manufacturing.¹² In June 2024, the U.S. Select Committee on China unveiled a critical mineral policy working group with the direct aim of countering China’s grip on these supply chains.¹³ Understandably, the primary driver of U.S. investments in Africa’s critical minerals is reducing its dependence on China and diversifying its critical mineral supply chain. The U.S. is actively pursuing policy initiatives to better secure its access to critical minerals and partnering with countries, including in Africa, to minimize its dependence on China.

U.S. Government Actions to Deepen Critical Mineral Cooperation with Africa

In attempts to diversify its critical mineral supply chain, the U.S. has turned to expanding cooperation with Africa. In August 2022, the White House released the U.S. strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, pledging to, “assist African countries to more transparently leverage their natural resources,” including critical minerals.¹⁴ The Biden Administration subsequently took steps to engage African countries politically and economically to further deepen their partnerships on critical minerals. In February 2023, the U.S.-established Mineral Security Partnership, composed of 14 countries and the EU, and eight mineral-rich African countries held a vice-ministerial meeting in Cape Town to discuss challenges and opportunities in Africa’s critical mineral sector.¹⁵ Among the African countries in attendance were Angola, Botswana, the DRC, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—most of whom have long-term mineral cooperation with China.

Priority Minerals and Key Projects

The United States has invested in multiple African projects to strengthen its critical mineral supply chain (see Table 2 below). Through agencies like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and by prioritizing private sector partnerships, and higher environmental standards, the U.S. government is attempting to differentiate itself from Chinese lenders, as DFC provides financial support for critical mineral extraction projects in Africa. DFC activity in Africa highlights the ongoing strategic competition between the U.S. and China, as Washington seeks to counter Beijing’s influence in the region. In its establishment in 2018, Congress called for DFC to be a “robust alternative” to authoritarian government investments, making the Corporation’s unofficial mission to counter China in conversations among U.S. officials.¹⁶ As a result, the United States aims for DFC to incentivize African partners, especially in the critical mineral industry, to partner with the U.S. and decrease African reliance on Chinese capital. The U.S. Export-Import Bank is also a lender for similar projects, loaning $1.6 billion to Sub-Saharan Africa in 2023 alone for sectors including mining and energy.¹⁷ Additionally, the U.S. has signed recent MOUs with Angola, Zambia, Botswana, and the DRC, which are rich in cobalt, copper, nickel, and manganese.

Similar Emphasis on Infrastructure

Both the U.S. and China are investing beyond the extraction of critical minerals. They both attempt to provide infrastructure that increases the efficiency of mineral trade. As shown in the two tables of projects above, China and the United States are each implementing a railway originating in Zambia that will carry copper, cobalt, and nickel. In 2024, the U.S. invested in the Lobito Railway Corridor Project that will run from Zambia to Angola, offloading critical minerals at the Port of Lobito.¹⁸ The U.S. intends this corridor to improve westward trade flows for critical minerals via the Atlantic, again diversifying U.S. access for supply chains that were previously located in Tanzania. The Chinese-backed Tanzania-Zambia railway will run between those two countries and end at the Port of Dar Es Salaam. China plans to use the railway to assist with a smoother transport of critical minerals, especially access to nickel, as Tanzania’s finance ministry predicts the railway will transport 3 million metric tons of minerals annually.¹⁹ These railways are a direct reflection of competition between the U.S. and China, as well as their rival demands for copper and cobalt from this region.

U.S. and Chinese State Funders

One of the key differences between China and the U.S.’s approaches to critical mineral investment in Africa is the government’s role. China’s investment in Africa is heavily state-driven, with Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) benefiting from favorable financing terms from Chinese banks and political support from the Chinese government. This allows them to secure long-term access to African resources, like JCHX acquiring the Lubambe Copper Mine located in Zambia, Africa’s second largest-copper producer behind the DRC.²⁰ In contrast, the U.S. approach is more market-driven, with private companies taking the lead in investments. The DFC tends to provide smaller scale grants and loans, with the largest loan in 2024 just over $500 million compared to an almost $2 billion Chinese loan to MMG, a subsidiary of one of the largest Chinese mining SOEs, China Minmetals Corporation (CMC) the previous year.

Although both the U.S. and China use government-backed funding, DFC primarily lends to the private sector, whereas Chinese development banks often finance African governments, state-run banks, or Chinese SOEs operating overseas. This is the case for the Khoemacau copper mine, which is financed by the China Development Bank, helping a Chinese subsidiary acquire it. In comparison, DFC partnered with the Africa Finance Corporation, the majority ownership of which belongs to private investors in Africa, to carry out the $500 million loan for the Lobito Corridor project. By having a more direct relationship with the private businesses, DFC is attempting to differentiate itself as a lender from its Chinese competitors. DFC also prioritizes environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards. China, in contrast, faces frequent criticism in Africa for weak ESG compliance, particularly in mining projects. According to the Business and Human Rights Resource Center, between 2021 and 2022, China was linked to 102 human rights and environmental law violations, with 20% coming from DRC and Zimbabwe mines.²¹

Conclusion

China and the U.S. are engaging Africa’s critical mineral sector in a competitive manner, both working to secure the resources needed to further their national interests and domestic industries. Although the U.S. invested more in Africa overall in 2023, China is by far the primary player in critical minerals. The U.S. and China share some similarities in their approaches to the African critical mineral market, both investing in extraction projects with railway projects to increase mineral trade, but the project financiers and the motivations for these projects differ. China’s approach is characterized by state-backed investments and a focus on securing long-term access to resources. The U.S. prioritizes private sector involvement and supply chain diversification to reduce reliance on China while pursuing clean energy, national security, and economic goals. The new Trump Administration will likely continue to pursue access to critical minerals throughout its term. President Trump has already proposed a deal with Greenland and has demanded access to critical minerals during recent discussions with Ukraine, viewing both countries as resource-rich opportunities. While Trump shares President Biden’s concerns about U.S. reliance on foreign nations for critical minerals, particularly China, it remains unclear whether he will further develop his predecessor’s diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa’s mineral-rich countries. The role that Africa will play in the U.S. critical mineral supply chain under Trump is uncertain, especially as China is likely to keep expanding its involvement in the African critical mineral sector.