The Iran war has been going on for nearly three weeks, and one question that keeps coming up is, “Why isn’t China actively stepping in to mediate this conflict, which is harmful to the global economy—and to its own interests as well?” The answer is very simple: China’s losses are smaller than those of the United States and Europe, as well as America’s allies outside those two regions. Moreover, as the war drags on, this disparity in losses will only widen further. Given that, why would China feel any urgent need to get actively involved?

Broadly speaking, views that consider China’s passivity unreasonable are still influenced by Zbigniew Brzezinski’s strategic concept of the “China-Russia-Iran grand triangle.” This framework creates the impression that “if Iran is in trouble, it’s most disadvantageous to China and Russia.” But the real situation is far more complex.

For a long time, Iran has never been an enthusiastic supporter of China; rather, it has sought balance between China and the United States. Admittedly, with the U.S. isolating Iran, Tehran’s economy relies on China’s energy demand to survive. However, Tehran has never abandoned the moderate path of seeking reconciliation with the United States—one key reason being that China has never provided security guarantees. Therefore, if Iran wants dual assurances on both economic and security fronts, it cannot put all its eggs in one basket.

On this point, many Chinese netizens are quite unforgiving toward Iran, believing that Tehran’s repeated rejections of China’s overtures stem from fear of upsetting the United States. In reality, Iran is simply acting like most middle powers: maximizing national interests by playing both sides between China and the U.S. As long as moderates hold power in Tehran, they will stick to this relatively safe approach.

However, the U.S. and Israel have effectively eliminated Iran’s moderate faction and the appeasement mindset they represented—thereby unleashing radicalism and hawkishness.

From Beijing’s perspective, a radical Tehran will need China even more, not less. Unless the U.S.-Israeli coalition achieves a truly decisive victory, the situation will only favor China. The longer the war drags on, the more advantageous it becomes for China.

The most obvious parallel case is the Russia-Ukraine war. Four years on, haven’t the losses suffered by the United States and Europe far exceeded China’s? Isn’t Moscow now more dependent on China than it was four years ago? From the perspective of “strategic profit and loss,” the Ukraine war provides evidence that Beijing has no reason to believe the Iran war would be disadvantageous to itself.

The key point is that the probability of a complete U.S.-Israeli victory is approaching zero.

For Israel to achieve its strategic goals, it cannot do so without U.S. assistance. Right now, three options sit on Trump’s Resolute Desk:

a. Bomb for 4–5 weeks, produce news photos of a “leveled Iran,” declare victory, withdraw, and exit with dignity.

b. Lower the victory threshold to ensuring the Strait of Hormuz remains open and genuinely stripping Iran of control over the strait.

c. Full-scale ground invasion, akin to the Iraq War, until the country is completely under control.

Option a resembles last year’s U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities, just on a larger scale. For the U.S. and Israel, this strategy is not far from defeat—especially considering that U.S. military bases in Gulf countries have suffered heavy damage, and Arab states on the peninsula no longer trust American security commitments. If Washington pretends to win and pulls out, it would completely lose the Gulf states, collapse its Middle East strategy, and leave Israel even more isolated. Meanwhile, Iran would still firmly control the Strait of Hormuz.

Option b seems relatively straightforward but is extremely complex and difficult in execution. The U.S. and Israel would need to deploy ground forces for area sweeps. This time, Tehran’s asymmetric warfare has very successfully highlighted its own deterrence. Even if the U.S. and Israel claim to control the Strait of Hormuz, a single successful suicide drone or mine hitting an oil tanker—causing an oil spill—would render the strait impassable until the spill is cleared. In this scenario, the cost for Iran to achieve its goal is extremely low, while the cleanup cost for the U.S. is extremely high.

Option c would be a catastrophic decision. Trump would turn himself into the very George W. Bush and Obama he heavily criticized—sinking even deeper into an overseas quagmire than Biden ever did. This would hollow out his own power base and effectively announce a midterm election landslide defeat (if elections can even be held normally). The wave of domestic opposition would spread from MAGA supporters to the Jewish community, ensuring defeatism permeates Washington, D.C.

The main blunder in Trump’s launch of this war was failing to secure support from his core voter base and overseas allies. He quickly found himself isolated by his own decision. On the other hand, although Iran has suffered heavy blows, it has instead fostered domestic unity, while the opposition has been marginalized.

A war of attrition is primarily a contest of willpower, with raw strength being secondary. Think of Vietnam: the Viet Cong’s capabilities were far inferior to America’s, yet they dragged the war out through sheer resolve until U.S. forces withdrew. Afghanistan is a similar example. Eradicating anti-American sentiment among 93 million people through military force alone is no easy task—especially when the U.S. and Israel have already demolished the bridge represented by Iran’s moderates.

This is how Beijing views the Iran war: all three options ultimately benefit China, especially the third.

Beijing doesn’t even need to supply Tehran with a single bullet—just maintain pre-war levels of China-Iran trade. This war of attrition alone would prevent the U.S. from committing resources to counter China in the Indo-Pacific; it might even force the diversion of Indo-Pacific resources back to the Middle East. This would create an even more favorable environment for Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue.

At the same time, the Ukraine battlefield would become more advantageous for Moscow. International oil prices have already reflected this trend in advance. Both China and Russia have gained greater leverage, accelerating the complete end of the era of U.S.-dominated unilateralism.

Even in the unlikely event that the U.S. and Israel achieve regime change and turn Tehran into a pro-American state, maintaining long-term rule over a pro-U.S. regime would still require cooperation with China. Middle East oil supply is indeed a thorny issue for China, but while the U.S. is busy fighting, Beijing is accelerating its摆脱 from oil dependence. There is currently no sign that Iran will surrender or suffer total defeat during Trump’s term. After all, this rugged, defensible country is extremely difficult to conquer.

Simply put, time is on Beijing’s side, not Washington’s.

There is an ancient Chinese saying: “Those who are fond of war will surely perish.” The young United States may not have fully tasted the bitterness of this adage yet. What is thought-provoking is that Trump—a president who has always been outspoken against overseas wars—has presided over what may be the most reckless overseas war in American history.

Venezuela may be a country where Trump can simply declare victory and move on, but Iran is not. It possesses extremely resilient religious forces, a long history, complex terrain, and a large population. Its destruction can only come from internal chaos, not external invasion. Most military experts will tell you that conquering Iran would require deploying a million troops at minimum—and even then, success is not guaranteed. Clearly, however, this advice was marginalized in the pre-war White House.

China understands this well. It knows what it means to “trade space for time.” When one’s own strength is absolutely inferior, only vast territory and resolute willpower can overcome difficulties—as demonstrated in China’s War of Resistance Against Japan nearly a century ago. This is Iran’s only path to survival.

Therefore, even if China wanted to intervene, it would only do so when the U.S. military is exhausted and eager for a dignified exit—not now. For the moment, China is keeping a low profile, offering only symbolic criticism of the aggression. Beijing will devote its time to injecting stability and predictability into the world order—distinguishing itself from America’s militarism and winning international recognition.

At this moment, if Trump still wants to “divide the cake” with Xi Jinping and carve up spheres of influence on the world map, he has little persuasive power left. Perhaps that’s why he postponed his visit to China. After all, Xi Jinping hasn’t done much, yet he has suddenly gained quite a few extra bargaining chips—something a “transactional president” like Trump doesn’t want to see.

Amid the noise questioning Trump, Beijing’s voice remains subdued—because China doesn’t want to derail the upcoming U.S.-China leaders’ summit. After all, this is likely to be a century-defining negotiation that heavily favors China.