Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to embark on a tour of Latin America this November, during which he will inaugurate a massive port funded by Beijing near Lima, Peru. Following this, he will attend the G20 leaders’ summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from November 18-19, 2024, where he will meet with Brazilian President Lula da Silva. Additionally, Beijing is preparing to host the forum for China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in April 2025, and several countries in the region are planning to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

These events reflect the depth of development occurring in the level and pace of relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean. They also highlight the diligent efforts by both parties to strengthen their cooperation, raising questions about the motivations and primary drivers behind this collaboration, as well as its future and the limits of enhancing cooperation between the two sides to higher levels.

Ongoing Developments

Several movements and developments indicate an increase in Latin American-Chinese cooperation, most notably:

Xi Jinping’s Upcoming Tour in Latin America: The Chinese president intends to travel to Latin America for a state visit to Brazil in November 2024 to participate in the G20 summit, during which he will meet with President Lula da Silva. During the tour, he will inaugurate the Shankai Port in Peru, a project within the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative, owned and managed by Hong Kong-based Cosco Shipping. This massive port, located just 80 kilometers north of Lima, plays a crucial role in China’s commercial ambitions. Once operational, it will reduce shipping times between Peru and China by 15 days, making it a pivotal hub for direct trade with Asia. The project, expected to be completed by late 2024 at a cost of approximately 3.6billion,willbeoneofthelargestprojectsalongthePacificCoast,significantlyboostingPeru′slogisticalcapacityandeconomicgrowth.Inthesamevein,Chinadonated3.6billion,willbeoneofthelargestprojectsalongthePacificCoast,significantlyboostingPeru′slogisticalcapacityandeconomicgrowth.Inthesamevein,Chinadonated7 million worth of vehicles and security scanners to Peru for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit taking place in Lima from November 10-16.

Colombia’s Plan to Join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative: On October 3, 2024, Colombia announced plans to join the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay are the only South American countries that have yet to become members of the initiative. On October 10, 2024, Colombian Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice Premier Han Zheng in Beijing, launching a joint working group for negotiations. While negotiations are still ongoing, Colombia’s interest underscores its desire to attract Chinese funding to key sectors such as clean energy, telecommunications, and transportation. Chinese investments in the country have sharply increased in recent years, with major companies participating in high-profile projects like the Bogotá metro, a $4.5 billion project led by Chinese firms. This is one of many initiatives highlighting Colombia’s growing role in China’s strategic expansion throughout the region.

Shift in Argentina’s Leadership Attitude Towards China: Earlier in October 2024, Argentine President Javier Milei, who describes himself as an “anarcho-capitalist,” made a significant shift in his stance towards Beijing, labeling the Asian giant as “an extremely interesting trade partner” and announcing plans for a bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping. This marks a stark departure from his previous rhetoric, where he vowed not to trade with China due to its communist government. The Argentine Foreign Ministry announced potential meeting dates for a face-to-face encounter between President Milei and his Chinese counterpart: the G20 summit in mid-November 2024, and the China and Latin American and Caribbean States Forum in April 2025, or a bilateral meeting before June 2025. China is one of Argentina’s largest trading partners, ranking second after Brazil, and last July renewed a $5 billion currency swap line for Argentina, extending the repayment period by another twelve months. This anticipated visit reflects regional leaders’ interests in enhancing cooperation with Beijing. According to the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, out of the nineteen current heads of state in Latin America, nine have visited China while in office.

Strengthening Partnerships in Clean Energy: A delegation of senior advisors from the Brazilian presidency traveled to China, where they met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi and representatives from companies like Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer BYD, which is building an electric vehicle factory in Brazil’s Bahia state. The factory is set to begin assembly before the end of the year and full production in the first half of 2025. Notably, the factory is being constructed on the site of a plant that was previously owned by Ford Motor Company before its closure in 2021. Other Chinese firms, such as Great Wall Motor, are also moving to Brazil, acquiring a Mercedes-Benz plant that was abandoned after the German company halted vehicle production in the country in 2020, citing tough economic conditions in Brazil. Latin America and the Caribbean, home to around 650 million people and much of the lithium needed by electric vehicle manufacturers for batteries, are markets that Beijing aims to expand its activities in. BYD stated it is considering building a factory in Mexico, where Chinese brands currently account for roughly 10% of new car sales and are rapidly expanding their fleet of electric buses from Colombia to Chile.

Factors Influencing the Future

The future of Chinese-Latin American cooperation and its ability to continue advancing is likely to hinge on several key factors, including:

Impact of U.S. Stance on Chinese-Latin American Engagement: The rising Chinese economic presence in Latin America has sparked concerns in the United States regarding Beijing’s control over strategic assets in the region, such as ports, energy networks, and transportation systems, which could be utilized for military or security purposes. The West accuses China of employing “debt trap diplomacy,” ensnaring developing countries in unsustainable loans to seize assets when they cannot repay. U.S. officials view Chinese investments as part of a broader strategy by Beijing to assert its influence in the Western Hemisphere, altering the foreign policy orientations of regional countries. With more than half of Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies located in Latin America, investment in the region could encourage countries to abandon Taiwan and adopt policies more aligned with Chinese priorities. Recently, U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai noted in an event held in São Paulo that Brazil must be cautious about joining the New Silk Road, encouraging Brazilian friends to assess “the risks in today’s economy” through “an objective lens, through a risk management perspective” and “really consider the best path