The sudden escalation of tensions in the Middle East has thus generated considerable expectations among regional states and the broader international community regarding China’s possible role. In recent years, China has actively promoted dialogue and reconciliation in Middle Eastern affairs. Notable examples include facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and supporting reconciliation talks among Palestinian political factions in Beijing, which led to the signing of the Beijing Declaration. These diplomatic initiatives have produced a positive impact in the region. Against this backdrop, many observers are closely watching China’s position and actions in the current conflict involving Iran, expecting China to continue playing a constructive role in easing tensions and promoting political solutions.

In terms of concrete actions, China has not deployed military forces to the Middle East nor provided new weapons assistance to any party involved in the conflict. Instead, it has primarily engaged through diplomatic channels.

The Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict erupted during the period when China was holding its annual sessions of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The “Two Sessions” constitute one of the most important political events in China each year, during which senior decision-makers and a large number of government officials are required to participate in legislative and consultative proceedings. Under such circumstances, the schedules of China’s foreign policy leadership were already highly constrained.

Despite this, China quickly activated diplomatic communication channels. During the meetings, Foreign Minister Wang Yi conducted multiple phone calls with his counterparts from relevant countries, expressing China’s concerns about the escalation of the regional situation and urging all parties to exercise restraint and pursue diplomatic solutions. At the same time, China dispatched its Special Envoy for Middle East Affairs Zhai Jun to visit countries in the region, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and engage in dialogue and coordination with relevant parties, promoting ceasefire efforts and attempting to prevent further escalation of the conflict.

Even amid significant domestic political commitments, China utilized multiple diplomatic channels to take proactive steps aimed at easing tensions and demonstrating its constructive and responsible role in regional affairs. This policy approach has prompted extensive discussion about China’s role and strategic calculations in the current conflict, while observers continue to watch how China assesses the evolving situation and what diplomatic steps it may take in the future.

The development of the current conflict has placed China in a complex – and somewhat awkward – strategic position. On the one hand, China clearly opposes the military actions taken by the United States and Israel against Iran. From Beijing’s perspective, these strikes represent a continuation of unilateral policies pursued by Washington in recent years. In particular, since the beginning of 2026, the United States has taken assertive actions in relation to several regional issues, which some observers view as part of a broader effort to reinforce its global strategic influence.

At the same time, Iran’s subsequent retaliatory actions have also objectively affected China’s interests. Following the outbreak of the conflict, Iran not only launched strikes against Israeli targets but also attacked targets in several neighboring Arab states, further heightening tensions across the region. More importantly, Iran began implementing a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, directly affecting the security of global energy transportation routes.

For China, the Strait of Hormuz holds significant strategic importance. Once the passage is disrupted, the security of China’s energy imports from the Gulf region may be affected. For many years, China has pursued a diversified energy import strategy, and several Gulf Arab states – including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Iraq – are important sources of China’s oil supply. With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz becoming increasingly uncertain, the transport routes for China’s oil and natural gas imports from these countries face growing risks, posing new challenges to China’s energy security.

Under these circumstances, while opposing the military actions of the United States and Israel, China has also adopted a cautious attitude toward certain Iranian retaliatory measures that may heighten regional risks. In particular, China has expressed concern over attacks against neighboring Arab states and actions that threaten the stability of key energy transport routes. Overall, China is more inclined to promote de-escalation of the conflict, encouraging diplomatic communication and political negotiations to ease tensions, prevent further escalation, and minimize negative impacts on global energy markets and the stability of the international economy.

When assessing the current situation, China must also take into account several important diplomatic agendas. One of these is the upcoming visit of U.S. President Donald Trump to China. In recent years, economic and trade frictions between China and the United States have persisted, with significant differences remaining over tariffs, import and export quotas, technological cooperation, and broader strategic interests. Although the two sides reached a temporary easing arrangement after multiple rounds of negotiations, the overall competitive dynamic has not fundamentally changed. Therefore, Trump’s visit is regarded in China as a politically and diplomatically significant event. Beijing hopes that the meeting between the two leaders can help manage differences, reduce the risk of confrontation, and create conditions for stabilizing bilateral relations.

China does not wish to see the current Middle Eastern tensions interfere with the upcoming summit between Chinese and U.S. leaders or introduce new uncertainties into bilateral economic relations. Accordingly, China prefers to call on all parties to exercise rationality and restraint and to gradually de-escalate the situation through diplomatic means.

Another important diplomatic agenda that China must consider is the China–Arab States Summit scheduled for June 2026. This will be the second summit between China and Arab states following the meeting held in December 2022, and it represents an important multilateral diplomatic event hosted by China. Through this summit, China hopes to further deepen cooperation with Arab countries – especially the Gulf Arab states – in areas such as economic development, energy cooperation, and emerging technologies.

At present, both sides see broad opportunities for collaboration in fields including artificial intelligence, aerospace, green technology, infrastructure development, and financial investment. China also hopes to leverage the large markets, abundant capital, and ambitious development plans of Gulf countries to advance both bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

At the same time, China has observed notable changes within the internal dynamics of the Arab world in recent years. Compared with the relatively stable cooperative atmosphere around 2022, some new sources of tension have emerged among regional states. For example, differences between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates over certain regional issues have become more apparent, and varying strategic perspectives have increasingly appeared among Arab states. In this context, Iran’s military actions against certain neighboring Arab states and the tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz could generate broader ripple effects on the regional security environment. China is therefore concerned that continued escalation of the conflict could influence how Arab states perceive the regional situation and the role of external actors.

China places great importance on its bilateral relationship with Iran and has clearly opposed the unilateral military actions taken by the United States and Israel, while expressing a degree of understanding regarding the pressures facing Iran. Even so, Beijing does not wish to see the conflict escalate further when considering its broader strategic and economic interests. In particular, with tensions rising around the Strait of Hormuz and volatility increasing in global energy markets, China’s energy security faces potential risks. At the same time, the upcoming China–U.S. summit and the China–Arab States Summit represent important diplomatic priorities. China therefore prefers to maintain a relatively stable regional environment to avoid negative impacts on its diplomatic and economic interests.

Under the combined influence of these multiple factors, China’s policy space in the current conflict is relatively limited, placing it in a complex strategic position. On the one hand, China opposes the military actions of the United States and Israel and expresses understanding for Iran’s situation. On the other hand, China does not support retaliatory actions by Iran that could further expand the scope of the conflict, particularly those affecting regional security and the stability of key energy transport routes.

In this context, China is more inclined to pursue limited and cautious mediation through diplomatic means, promoting de-escalation through communication, persuasion, and political dialogue rather than intervening in a more direct or confrontational manner. This relatively restrained and balanced policy approach reflects China’s broader strategic calculations in navigating a highly complex regional crisis.